

WHEN DOES THE COAST GUARD'S FLAG COME FORWARD?

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Military History

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MASTER OF MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE

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The opinions and conclusions expressed herein are those of the student author and do not necessarily represent the views of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College or any other governmental agency. (References to this study should include the foregoing statement.)

ABSTRACT

WHEN DOES THE COAST GUARD'S FLAG COME FORWARD? by Thomas G. Nelson, CDR, USCG, 103 pages.

The United States Coast Guard has strong historical ties to the Navy. Having participated in most of the nation's armed conflicts, the Coast Guard has clearly demonstrated its value as a naval force. Numerous times during the previous two hundred years however, this ability, viewed by some as redundant, has led to inquiries as to the suitability of disbanding the small service or having the Navy absorb it. Consistently preventing this was the fact the role as a naval force was only one of the numerous functions the Coast Guard performed. Many of these other missions, especially those involving law enforcement, could not be undertaken by any other service because of what is commonly known as the Posse Comitatus Act. This has had great significance in the aftermath of 9/11. With the formation of the Department of Homeland Security, the Coast Guard has been given the lead role in the maritime realm of preventing terrorist attacks and reducing vulnerabilities. Maybe now is the time for the Coast Guard to step out of the larger service's shadow and end the two-century-old struggle for parity with the Navy by concentrating on being what it really is . . . the world's best coast guard.

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

The idea for this thesis came from a discussion the author had with the Director of the Army's Combat Studies Institute (CSI) at Fort Leavenworth, Colonel Lawyn C. Edwards, during a chance meeting in one of the school's corridors. After the usual introductions, the subject of the new Department of Homeland Security immediately arose and quickly led to the question of how it would affect the relationship between the Coast Guard and the Navy. With the Nation at war with terrorism, would the Coast Guard be pulled into the Navy to augment it as it had during previous wars, or was this no longer feasible or even possible since the Coast Guard has its own major role within the new department?

As the conversation progressed, Colonel Edwards asked, "When does the Coast Guard's flag come forward?" It was an interesting question. The Colonel, of course, was questioning more than the physical position of the flag. At issue was the Coast Guard's identity and recognition. Viewed as a service that has struggled for parity with the Navy for more than two centuries, maybe the tragic events of 9/11 and the following demand for improved homeland security will finally allow the Coast Guard to be noticed and its value acknowledged by more political leaders and the general public. In turn, this may lead to an increased budget that will permit the Coast Guard to operate more effectively, providing even better service to the nation. In time, we shall see.

Though it was a challenging assignment, I appreciate the opportunity afforded to me by the school to write this thesis. The many discussions about the subject were enlightening, to say the least, and allowed me to see the Coast Guard in a different light. In any event, I am indebted to all three members of my Thesis Committee; Colonel

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ACRONYMS

C2	Command and Control
C4ISR	Command, Control, Communications and Computers, Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance
CBRNE	Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear, and High-Yield Explosives
CIA	Central Intelligence Agency
COPT	Captain of the Port
DGDP	Directorate of Graduate Degree Programs
DHS	Department of Homeland Security
DOD	Department of Defense
FBI	Federal Bureau of Investigation
FEMA	Federal Emergency Management Agency
GDP	Graduate Degree Programs
LEDET	Law Enforcement Detachment
MDA	Maritime Domain Awareness
MIO	Maritime Interception Operations
MSST	Maritime Safety and Security Team
NORTHCOM	U.S. Northern Command
NSF	National Strike Force
SAR	Search and Rescue
TACLET	Tactical Law Enforcement Team
UAV	Unmanned Aerial Vehicle
USCG	U.S. Coast Guard
WMD	Weapons of Mass Destruction

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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

Today, the Coast Guard will:

- Board 3 high interest vessels
- Enforce 103 security zones
- Board 138 vessels of law enforcement interest
- Seize 39 pounds of marijuana and 324 pounds of cocaine with a street value of \$10.8 million
- Interdict and rescue 15 illegal migrants
- Save 11 lives
- Assist 136 people in distress
- Protect \$3.2 million in property
- Perform 450 missions underway in port, waterway, and coastal areas
- Fly 165 air missions, logging 320 hours
- Open 38 new cases for marine violation of federal statutes
- Process 238 mariner licenses and documents
- Board 152 large vessels for port safety checks
- Conduct 20 commercial fishing vessel safety exams and issue 11 fishing vessel compliance decals
- Respond to 19 oil or hazardous chemical spills totaling 2,700 gallons
- Investigate 38 vessel casualties involving collisions, allisions or groundings
- Service 135 aids to navigation
- Monitor the transit of 2,557 commercial ships entering and leaving U.S. ports
- Assist 8 vessels in ice conditions during winter, each vessel averaging 30,000 tons in cargo. Each vessel's cargo averages \$1 million in value during the Great Lakes ice season
- Conduct 296 vessel safety checks and teach boating safety courses to 289 boaters¹

The Coast Guard's Position

Normally, when the services' individual ensigns are displayed, they are done so in order respective of their age, that is, the date they were created. The Coast Guard's though, is usually displayed last, as the fifth flag, even though it is older than the Air Force and, in terms of continuous service, is older than the Navy. When the nation was brand new, the Navy was disbanded shortly after the Revolutionary War. During this period, the Revenue Cutter Service, the primary forerunner of today's Coast Guard, was established on 4 August 1790. The Army, established by the Continental Congress on 14 June 1775, is the oldest of all our services. The Continental Navy was founded on 13 October 1775, and the formal recognition of the Marines was on 10 November of the same year while the Air Force, with roots in the Army that go back to August 1907, became an independent service upon the signing of the National Security Act of 1947 by President Harry S. Truman. This act established the Department of Defense, which incidentally, prior to the creation of the Department of Homeland Security, was the most recent large-scale reorganization of the U.S. government.

The title of this thesis, however, is questioning more than the physical position of the flag. At issue is the Coast Guard's identity and recognition. Often viewed as a service that has struggled for parity with the Navy for more than two centuries, maybe the tragic events of 11 September 2001 and the following need for improved homeland security will finally allow the Coast Guard to step out of the Navy's shadow and have its value acknowledged by more political leaders and the general public. In turn, this may lead to an increased budget that will permit the Coast Guard to operate more effectively, providing even better service to the nation.

A Unique, Multimission, Maritime Service

The Coast Guard actually is a relatively small service, especially when compared to the Navy. The Navy has more than 295 ships and 4,000 aircraft, while the Coast Guard has 39 medium and high endurance cutters, not including icebreakers, and approximately 170 operational aircraft. More than 380,000 active-duty men and women consisting of 55,000 officers and 320,000 enlisted personnel staff the Navy. Additionally, there are at least 150,000 reservists and 180,000 civilian employees. The Coast Guard is comprised of approximately 38,000 active duty personnel, 8,000 reservists, 6,000 civilian employees, and 35,000 volunteers in the auxiliary.²

The men and women of the Coast Guard are spread around the world, though the majority of them are stationed along the coasts of the United States. They maintain round-the-clock patrols with boats, cutters, and aircraft. During every minute of all three hundred and sixty-five days a year, there are boat and helicopter crews on duty, prepared to launch within minutes of notification of an emergency. Having such people and equipment readily available at all times makes the Coast Guard a true asset to the nation. No other organization has the ability to respond as quickly to as wide a variety of demands and missions over an area as large as that covered by the Coast Guard. Granted, some local fire departments or police forces may respond in a timelier manner, but they do so in a much smaller geographical area and have very specific roles. If for example, a law enforcement action involving a vehicle chase causes an accident and subsequent fire, several agencies in addition to the police, such as a fire department and Emergency Medical Services (EMS) will need to respond. In a similar situation on the water, a single Coast Guard boat, cutter, or aircraft will handle all roles, easily transitioning from one to

another. This concept also applies to larger scale, multi-faceted situations involving numerous assets over widespread areas of operations. This is possible because the Coast Guard is a collection of different but related functions.

The United States Coast Guard is a unique, multi-mission organization. Its primary purpose is to protect America's maritime interests in the nation's ports and harbors, inland waterways, and along the coast. It may also be called upon to serve in any other maritime region, including international waters. Though it is one of the Five Armed Services, the Coast Guard is different from the other services in that Congress has authorized the Coast Guard as the only Armed Force permitted to enforce U.S. laws. This distinction is important for the "Posse Comitatus Act," which formally is Title 18, Section 1385, of the *U.S. Code*, is a law strictly prohibiting Federal troops from being used for civil law enforcement. This special authorization for the Coast Guard is what legally enables it to perform the bulk of its responsibilities and missions. The five major areas of responsibility of the Coast Guard are: Maritime Security, Maritime Safety, Protection of Natural Resources, Maritime Mobility, and National Defense. Each of these areas has sub-component missions as well, that can be viewed in table 1.

Table 1. Subcomponent Missions
MARITIME SAFETY
<input type="checkbox"/> Search and Rescue <input type="checkbox"/> Maritime Safety <input type="checkbox"/> Recreational Boating Safety <input type="checkbox"/> International Ice Patrol
MARITIME MOBILITY
<input type="checkbox"/> Aids to Navigation <input type="checkbox"/> Icebreaking Services <input type="checkbox"/> Vessel Traffic / Waterways Management <input type="checkbox"/> Bridge Administration
MARITIME SECURITY
<input type="checkbox"/> Drug Interdiction <input type="checkbox"/> Alien Migrant Interdiction <input type="checkbox"/> EEZ and Living Marine Resource <input type="checkbox"/> General Maritime Law Enforcement <input type="checkbox"/> Law / Treaty Enforcement
NATIONAL DEFENSE
<input type="checkbox"/> General Defense Duties <input type="checkbox"/> Homeland Security <input type="checkbox"/> Port and Waterways Security <input type="checkbox"/> Polar Icebreaking
PROTECTION OF NATURAL RESOURCES
<input type="checkbox"/> Marine Pollution Education, Prevention, Response and Enforcement <input type="checkbox"/> Foreign Vessel Inspections <input type="checkbox"/> Living Marine Resources Protection <input type="checkbox"/> Marine and Environment Science

Source: <http://www.uscg.mil/hq/g-cp/comrel/factfile/> website

The Coast Guard's Lineage

What we call the Coast Guard today is actually a collection of Federal organizations that no longer exist. The first of these was the U.S. Lighthouse Service, established on 7 August 1789, which was the first public work provided for by an Act of Congress.³ Though the public had maintained lighthouses since 1716, President George

Washington's approval of this "ninth Act of Congress" brought nautical aids to navigation into a federalized system and gave official recognition to the Nation's interest of safety at sea.⁴

Another antecedent agency was the Revenue Cutter Service, the concept for which was written into law three days less than a year after the Lighthouse Service. This service, which actually did not have an official name yet and was also often referred to as the Revenue Marine Bureau, was to serve as a collections and maritime enforcement arm of the Treasury Department. Much of the second chapter of this thesis will be dedicated to the actions and history of this service, for of all the predecessor agencies this one has the strongest ties to the U.S. Navy and the mission of homeland security.

The Lifesaving Service can trace its roots back to the *Act of March 3, 1847* (9 Stat. L., 175, 176) when funds were first placed at the disposal of the Secretary of Treasury for the expressed purpose of rendering assistance to shipwrecked mariners from the shore. At first, equipment was left in small sheds along the Jersey shore for volunteers to use, while members of the Revenue Marine Service were recognized as the primary rescuers at sea. As it turned out, Keepers of the Lighthouse Service were often the ones rounding up people to help save storm victims. This often proved difficult and in time, paid positions were created.

The Steamboat Inspection Service was created between 7 July 1838 and 30 August 1852 as another agency under the Department of Treasury. This organization was to establish and enforce regulations that would protect passengers and crews aboard vessels propelled by steam power. This became increasingly important as explosions and fires became common occurrences as more and more ships relied on steam. The actions

of this agency are responsible for preventing many unfortunate accidents and for saving an untold number of lives.

The Bureau of Navigation was created in 1884 after several books were published during the mid 1800s describing the conditions under which many sailors worked. As these books became popular with the public, attention was directed towards the deplorable, harsh treatment the merchant mariner received. The Bureau served to mediate disputes and set out to improve existing circumstances. It also was to oversee collection of tonnage dues, document vessels, and administer details of the laws of navigation. Though technology has changed while public interests and political emphasis has shifted, the functions of all five of these organizations are still performed in some capacity by today's Coast Guard.

An Author's Challenge

Relatively speaking, there are not many books about the United States Coast Guard. Many libraries and bookstores have shelves filled with books about the other services while there are few, if any, about this unique maritime organization. With a service that is almost as old as the nation itself, one would believe that it would be a popular subject. The few books about the Coast Guard available usually discuss the organization's history, various missions in general terms, and tend to address the important issues that were current during the time of publication. With Homeland Security being a relatively new term, there are no books available yet that discuss the subject. This will cause certain limitations in regards to the amount of viewpoints and perspectives subject to research. Not surprising is that there are many recent articles available in various publications and periodicals addressing Homeland Security which

often center around the Coast Guard's role. One of the original intents of this manuscript was to settle the often-debated issue of whether Homeland Security is a new mission for the Coast Guard or one that has been provided by the service since its inception. After a considerable amount of research and consideration though, that issue really is not as important as what the Coast Guard is doing now that there is an obvious need for the mission. This concept will serve as a guide towards setting delimitations.

As mentioned earlier, the Coast Guard has many missions. These other missions will not be discussed in great detail for this thesis will focus on the Coast Guard's historic role and relationship with the U.S. Navy, Homeland Security, and the interrelation and impact on one another in regards to the future. There will be some mention of the various responsibilities and roles the organization has, not only to introduce the reader to the many and diverse missions conducted by the Coast Guard on a routine basis, but to also allow a better understanding of the significance of this newly acquired emphasis on the security of the nation's maritime. Additionally, the discussion on the history of the service will be limited to those aspects that relate in some way, or have bearing on the current Coast Guard and Navy relationship.

The Burden

Traditionally an under-funded yet over utilized organization, the Coast Guard has, over time, built a reputation of consistently being able to "do more with less." This has allowed very high expectations to be placed on the Coast Guard. It is expected to meet the increasing demands of its homeland security tasks while continuing to perform all of its other missions. Simultaneously, the Coast Guard must address a myriad of issues associated with the transition into the new Department of Homeland Security.

Because of the public's rising concern with security, the Coast Guard's role in homeland security has received a lot of national attention. With this attention came a proposed increase in budget as well as pressure to produce results--not just in Homeland Security however, but also in all assigned missions. Some of this budget is earmarked for the Coast Guard's "Deepwater" recapitalization project, geared to modernize its cutters, boats, aircraft, and communications abilities. It will take time for the Coast Guard to get new systems and equipment in place and to attract and retain the required additional workforce, though. In the meantime, using obsolete and rapidly deteriorating assets, the small force, which is already stretched thin, will continue to uphold the proud and colorful traditions of the service, which include rising to meet any challenge no matter how daunting. Given the enormity of the burden, can the organization succeed this time? There is too much at stake to risk failure. With the importance to the nation that Homeland Security has, maybe now is not the time for the Coast Guard to uphold this tradition, but rather it should reduce its involvement in some mission areas that are not as critical to the nation as Homeland Security is. The demand for security of the nation is continuing to build momentum and if the Coast Guard is not careful, the service may find itself foundering beneath a tidal wave of new requirements and shortage of resources.

Though the events of 11 September 2001 increased the Coast Guard's involvement with National Defense, namely Homeland Security, there has not been a reduction in requirements involving all the other missions the service was performing before 11 September 2001.⁵ The Coast Guard's Abstract of Operations reports clearly show several missions are being conducted substantially below historical levels. Of significance, is the decline in missions related to law enforcement, such as drug and

migrant interdiction. Now, more than ever is the time to keep the country's borders from being too porous. With smuggling activities having possible ties to terrorist organizations, the decline in law enforcement missions is in direct conflict with the National Security Strategy. With eleven cutters and other assets deployed to the Middle East in support of Operation Iraqi Freedom, the Coast Guard has admitted that it is unlikely that the decline will be reversed any time soon. There is a chance in fact that things will get worse. Each time there is a terror alert, there is the accompanying requirement for heightened security. This causes an increase in sorties of all assets above the level normally programmed. Scheduled maintenance is delayed, and the condition of the equipment continues to deteriorate. Some resources may be decommissioned ahead of schedule because of this, which will further exasperate the situation since replacements are not ready yet.

The increased tempo associated with terror alerts, combined with the increased maintenance requirements, have a price in terms of human capital as well. In addition to increased duty and watch standing, crews are working hard to preserve the assets and keep them ready at all times. These aircraft and boats are the same ones used to conduct the rest of the Coast Guard's missions. One of these missions in particular, requires assets to be ready for immediate use. This mission, Search and Rescue, is so entwined into the fabric of the organization, that up until 11 September 2001, it practically defined the Coast Guard and gave it its identity. It is the affinity for this mission, and the Homeland Security mission, that keeps most members of the Coast Guard in uniform. Despite the long, hard hours, the Coast Guard does not have a retention problem. The problem though, is fatigue. With fatigue comes safety concerns.

In light of all this, it is no surprise that questions have arisen in regards to the Coast Guard's naval role. As the Nation's lead federal agency for Maritime Homeland Security, it is felt by some that the Coast Guard does not belong overseas but rather should be doing what its name implies--guarding U.S. coasts. There is a significant and credible threat to the homeland, so maybe the organization's expeditionary role should be terminated. With possibly overlapping duties, Coast Guard assets deployed to support the U.S. Navy have the appearance of redundancy. One who has raised a question about this issue is none other than the Secretary of Defense, Donald H. Rumsfeld. He has asked why Navy ships need the Coast Guard to defend them and why the Navy cannot protect itself in war overseas. Recognizing how busy the Coast Guard is, he is considering removing the small service from involvement in future wars.⁶

Is this then, the mission that should be given up? Obviously there are various implications that would go along with a decision to sever the relationship between the Coast Guard and Navy. For some, there is the perceived loss of prestige, for unknown to many, the Coast Guard has long had an expeditionary role and has participated in every major war of American involvement. This decision would therefore certainly have historic significance. Another issue is one of budget. Some Coast Guard programs get additional funding from the Navy--a cost versus gain analysis should be completed to determine if the benefits of having all assets freed from naval service would be negated by the reduction in funds. Should the Coast Guard continue with its tradition and embrace the added burdens discussed, or is it time to surrender the expeditionary role to enable unprecedeted performance in the homeland security role that is perceived to have greater importance? Alternatively, is it possible that the missions accomplished by the

Coast Guard overseas actually serve as a force multiplier, contributing to the security of the nation and its overall well-being?

¹U.S. Coast Guard, *Department of Homeland Security United States Coast Guard Fiscal Year 2004 Report, Fiscal Year 2003 Performance Report, Fiscal Year 2005 Budget in Brief*, 1 February 2004.

²2004 Almanac of Sea Power, *Sea Power* 47, no. 1 (January 2004): 1, 113.

³Stephen H. Evans, *The United States Coast Guard 1790-1915: A Definitive History* (Annapolis: U.S. Naval Institute, 1949), 4.

⁴Ibid.

⁵Ronal O'Rourke, "Homeland Security: Coast Guard Operations-Background and Issues for Congress," *CRS Report for Congress*, 19 July 2002, 2.

⁶John Mintz and Vernon Loeb, "Coast Guard Fights to Retain War Role," *Washington Post*, 31 August 2003, 7.

CHAPTER 2

HISTORIC OVERVIEW OF THE U.S. COAST GUARD'S NAVAL ROLE

In its military character, naval discipline, and duties, the Revenue-Cutter Service is now and always has been constantly regarded as a part of the military service of the government. The brave and gallant men of this service did heroic work in the Revolutionary War, in the War of 1812, in the Mexican War, in the Seminole War, in the Civil War and in the War with Spain. . . . The status of the Revenue-Cutter Service is that of a coast guard navy.¹

Representative William Sulzer

Keeping always under steam and ever ready, in the event of extraordinary need, to render valuable service, the cutters can be made to form a coast guard whose value it is impossible at the present time to estimate.²

Army and Navy Journal

The Coast Guard can trace its origins back to the emergence of the United States as a new nation. By the time President George Washington had been in office for a year, it was already clear that something had to be done about the empty federal treasury. The debt incurred during the Revolution needed to be paid and it was common knowledge that a government without money could not reasonably expect to conduct business with other nations. As the first Secretary of the Treasury, Alexander Hamilton convinced Congress that an organization needed to be created to collect tariffs provided for in the Revenue Act of 1789. With most of the merchant mariners having perfected their smuggling skills while avoiding the British Levies, it was decided that a small seagoing military force of “ten boats for a collection of revenue” be established.³ Thus was born what came to be known as the Revenue Cutter Service--the forerunner of today’s Coast Guard.

The Act itself referred to “Revenue Cutters” but did not actually specify them as all being united in one service. They were to be built and operated under the auspices of the collector of customs in the area in which they were scheduled to operate. This explains the slight differences in their design. The officers aboard the cutters were designated as “Officers of the Customs” with some coming from the former Continental Navy. The force as a whole, the original “system of cutters,” was often referred to as the Revenue Marine, Revenue Service, or Revenue Cutter Service. There really was very little administration in regards to the fleet. The local collectors had broad discretion on their cutter’s employment and, as it often turned out, used them for multiple purposes. The Secretary of Treasury though, still had overall responsibility and viewed the cutters as a small force, or service that had the specific function of protecting the nation’s revenue.

Arising from the issue of financial concern, the cost of running the service was to be kept to a minimum. Alexander Hamilton directed, “I shall hope for the strictest economy. . . . The establishment not being entirely agreeable even to members of Congress, it will require uncommon care that it be not rendered more objectionable by any unnecessary expense.”⁴ This guidance has been followed ever since. The Coast Guard’s budget has historically been relatively small, and up until 1998, there existed a strong internal organizational pressure to “do more with less.”⁵ Highlighting the initial success of this miniature navy that only cost \$10,000, is the fact that 92 percent of the nation’s income was from customs collection and that all \$80 million of foreign debt had been paid off by 1796.⁶

The continental navy had been disbanded upon the conclusion of the Revolutionary War. It was feared that England would not tolerate naval competition, and since the new nation planned to avoid involvement in foreign trouble, it seemed unlikely that one would be needed. Trouble with this national policy arose during the late 1790s. At war with England, France wished to damage their maritime enemy by preventing trade with other nations, including America. Much like now, foreign trade was of paramount importance to the new nation. The only maritime forces available to intercede on behalf of America were the Treasury department's individual cutters. In addition to their collection of the revenue, the cutters were ordered to defend the coast and protect America's commerce.⁷ Though hard pressed, ten small cutters would probably be able to do this to some extent, as long as French warships did not arrive at our ports. Realizing this, Congress, on 3 May 1798, reauthorized the United States Navy. Before the year was out, a few ships were afloat, but more time was needed to build additional ships and train crews. Therefore, the Congress decided to authorize the Revenue Cutters to operate under the direction of the Secretary of the Navy at the President's discretion.⁸ Though this allowed the assignment of individual cutters, there were times the entire fleet was temporarily transferred over from the Department of Treasury. The actual authority to transfer the service as a whole did not actually come about until 1915, with the formation of the Coast Guard.

Despite the increased demands on the small cutter fleet, this new relationship with the Navy soon proved beneficial. The cutter men themselves knew their vessels were quickly deteriorating and were in relatively bad shape. The Treasury Department, probably because of the first secretary's fiscal warnings mentioned earlier, was hesitant

in releasing funds for repairs or replacement of equipment. When the Navy gained control over these cutters, they found them unsuitable. Rather quickly, the government permitted the construction of new, more capable vessels. Though the Navy kept some of these ships, at the conclusion of the Quasi-War with France on 3 February 1801, the men of the Revenue Marine received the rest and continued with their initially assigned duties aboard larger and faster vessels with more numerous and powerful cannon. These cutters, with their increased capabilities, would soon pay off.

Much like the French, the British sought to hurt their enemy through economic blockade. Once again, the actions of foreign nations dragged America into conflict. It was not long before the public grew tired of having their merchant vessels seized and the seamen forced to serve in the British Navy. With only five operational frigates available, the U.S. Navy would definitely need help against an enemy at least twenty times more powerful.⁹ Immediately upon the declaration of war in 1812, the Revenue Cutters engaged Britain's vessels. This time however, the enemy did send ships of war.

Though outgunned, the cutters often used their speed and size to their advantage, and came up alongside to take the enemy through boarding. Of interesting note, is that since the cutters had such a small crew, they often took on volunteers before going into action. At least on one occasion, these volunteers were from the Navy, as evidenced by the actions between the cutter *Vigilant* and the British sloop *Dart* near Newport Harbor, 4 October 1813.¹⁰ Overall, the cutter men gave a good account for themselves during the war and even managed to seize and capture some larger vessels, though most of these were merchants. At the conclusion, battle casualties, much higher than those from the Quasi-War with France, were placed on Navy pensions.¹¹ The disabled cutter men would

have been at a loss for income otherwise, for the Treasury Department had no such program.

Even when the nation was not at war, the Revenue Cutters were busy protecting America. After the French and British threats were resolved, the next ones to be addressed were piracy and Slave Trade Act violators. Two new cutters, the *Alabama* and *Louisiana*, became widely known for their success in these endeavors. Not only did the cutter men capture pirates and slavers with their vessels at sea, but in port or on land as well. The men of the Revenue Marine were reported to have raided and burned numerous shore dwellings to deny the pirates and slavers from having bases of operations. This constant pressure contributed to driving them away from the Gulf of Mexico and Southern shores of the United States.¹²

As the number of cutters in service grew, so did their reputation, for the increase in cutters and men allowed an increase in accomplishments. These cutters represented the only law on the sea for there was no police or other agency that had vessels of any significance. The cutters, for the most part, still operated in localized areas and became known by the people living there. It is no surprise then, that the cutter men were the ones who were often called upon to help in various situations – even those that were non-maritime in nature.

An excellent example of this is the Revenue Marine's involvement in the Seminole Wars during the 1820s and 1830s. After Florida's governor was killed and a column of American soldiers was practically wiped out by the Indians, cutters were dispatched to protect ports and coastal villages. The cutters were instrumental in providing supplies, transport, and the transfer of important messages. The cutter men

even formed shore parties to track the Indians and used their cannon to thwart attacks. When necessary, they used the cutters to evacuate the civilians to save them from the threat. During the Seminole Wars, the Revenue Cutters operated in the Joint environment and engaged in their first amphibious assaults.¹³ Cutters, with their minimum draft, brought soldiers and Marines across the shallows and onto the beach. After several years, during which approximately half of the cutters in service responded, Florida was secure. In appreciation of their efforts, Florida offered the cutter men homesteads as a reward.¹⁴

Much like the Seminole Wars, there were no ship-to-ship actions during the Mexican War since the enemy did not possess a navy. This was definitely to the Revenue Marine's advantage, for many of the cutters were in poor condition. The service had recently experimented with steam power and had little success. Those few vessels that could stay in operational condition were not well suited for naval engagements. Exposed paddle wheels, vulnerable boilers, and less deck space for guns meant that wind-filled canvas could make older sailing ships more than a match for them.

Though several cutters were given directly to the navy, for the first time a cutter squadron was formed and placed under the command of a Revenue Service officer, Captain John A. Webster.¹⁵ He was ordered to safeguard the revenue and to help with the war effort. His fleet was placed at the disposal of the Commanding General of the Army, and he was to cooperate with the Commodore of Naval Forces. The cutters again proved their worth, completing scouting and reconnaissance missions; assisting with the transport of troops, supplies, and mail; delivering messages and dispatches; and even by putting down a mutiny aboard a troop ship. When other ships ran aground, cutters towed

them back to deeper water. While working with the Navy, they participated in the blockade, as well as the bombardment of forts and with the delivery of Marines.

During the Civil War, the Revenue Cutter Service acted much like before, and performed all the missions it had during the Seminole and Mexican Wars. Though it possessed improved and more numerous vessels, crews sympathetic to the Confederacy manned several of these, and thus the Union was unable to take full advantage of its larger and more powerful fleet. The one mission that the Revenue Marine Service was involved with that was different from the past wars was its direct support of the Lighthouse Establishment as it replaced and repaired various navigational aids while Union forces pushed south and reasserted maritime dominance. This included setting special buoys and lights to be used by the Navy, much like the Coast Guard does now in its expeditionary role.¹⁶

Though all these missions were very important to the success of the Union's war effort, the strict revenue protection that the cutter men were charged with cannot be overlooked, especially since tariffs had increased by almost fifty per cent to cover the high expenses of the war. The Revenue Marine Service's success and its value to the nation was underscored by an increase in collections from thirty-nine million to one hundred-two million dollars during the course of the Civil War.¹⁷ This figure is that much more impressive when considering, that the complete force was unavailable as some served with the South and a good portion served with the Army and Navy.

The Revenue Cutter Service went to war a final time with the Navy in 1898, this time against Spain. Unlike the past, this war had the nation facing the challenge of covering two oceans. The small Navy was in dire need of more officers, men, and ships.

Nineteen cutters transferred over, covering white paint with haze-gray. In addition to the measurable assets, the small service also brought with it a wealth of experience operating in the waters around Cuba, where it had consistently patrolled for several years before the outbreak of war. Though the cutters' actions and exploits were not anywhere as numerous as those in previous wars, the small service ironically received more national attention than in the past. In part this was due to President McKinley, who commended the service for simultaneous achievements of peace and war, recognizing the Overland Expedition wherein cutter men drove a herd of reindeer across the vast frozen landscape to save the crews of stranded whaling ships locked in the ice in northern Alaska, and the heroic deeds of cutter men in Cardenas Bay, Cuba.

There was also the issue of America's actions in the Pacific, where the U.S. Navy, with the help of a new Revenue Cutter, brought war to the Spanish in the Philippines. Viewed by some as aggressive westward expansion, this was, of course, an important political topic of the time. The Revenue Marine Service benefited from the exposure. This time there could be no question or debate the cutters had clearly acted in a true naval role as part of an expeditionary force rather than just in the usual, traditional roles of revenue protection and law enforcement. Congress had to recognize the Revenue Marine as a military service. This, in turn, led to pensions, disability payments, and retirement options for the men. Lack of this association with the Navy and the military mission would have relegated cutter men as civil service and therefore would have denied them these much sought after benefits, as had always previously been the case.

Despite the frequent success of the service, ever conscious of economy, Congress was often not pleased. At various times during its history, the Revenue Cutter Service

came close to being abolished. The usual reasons for this was the absurdity of having two naval forces with seemingly redundant roles and the cost of running the service. Congress used this argument several times over the years whenever they did not want to approve budgets that included increased funding for the Revenue Marine to purchase new cutters. It was often argued by politicians that the U.S. Navy could fulfill the functions of both services. One of the first times this issue arose, was during the early 1830's. For the previous decade, while the Revenue Cutters had been busy, the Navy had not been. There had been no enemy navy to defend against. Old ships were retired and without a viable threat, there existed no pressing need to replace them. Numerous Naval officers were furloughed and were in search of jobs. Many of these officers went to work for the Department of Treasury, accepting commissions with the Revenue Marine in the interim, until they were recalled to the Navy. Friction amongst the officers was common, as some naval officers did not care for their duties for, as it turned out, they were vastly different from what they had trained for with the Navy. The cutter men resented having their promotion opportunities ruined by the newcomers. Soon, Secretary of the Treasury, Louis McLane decided to allow officers to hold only one commission, forcing officers to make a choice and determine where their loyalties lay.¹⁸ Though some officers chose to stay with the Revenue Marine, others did not. A rivalry had begun.

One of the issues that arose was over uniforms. With the exception of buttons and other minor items, the uniforms of the two services were essentially the same. When a previous Secretary of the Navy, Levi Woodbury, became the Secretary of the Treasury, he ordered the cutter men to change theirs so they no longer looked like the Navy's.¹⁹ He also ordered the cutter men to resume arduous winter sailing patrols to aid vessels in

distress. Though he was probably not popular with the men at the time, this order may have contributed to saving the Revenue Marine, for no one wanted to take on this task. Despite the friction and rivalry, the Navy wanted no part of the Revenue Marine's duties. They did not want to undertake missions that would detract from their war readiness. Examples of such missions, taken from "*Regulations, U.S. Revenue-Marine, 1834*" are included in the passage below, written by Stephen H. Evans, one of the foremost Coast Guard Historians:

As early as McLane's day, the service watched over a wide variety of national interests afloat. Revenue-cutters enforced customs and navigation laws; anti-wrecking, plundering, piracy, and slave trade acts; quarantine regulations; neutrality laws; and one of the first federal conservation statutes, the Timber Reserve Act, a measure prohibiting export of the Florida liveoak lumber needed in building stout hulls for U.S. men-o'-war. In addition, cutters often gave assistance to vessels in distress, and the captains acted as inspectors of lighthouses and buoys whenever this work did not interfere with the duties prescribed by law. By the 1830's, therefore, the service was an agency for enforcing law; preventing loss of life, property, and freedom; and for reinforcing the Navy in time of war.²⁰

In 1843, the cost of running the service during the 1830's was questioned since collections had decreased by approximately nine million dollars though the Revenue Marine's expense rose by fifty-eight thousand dollars.²¹ During this period, the service had sent half its fleet to Florida to fight the Seminoles while the rest of the force remained behind to conduct the traditional duties and even began the winter patrols. Some laws had changed and taxes were lowered. Additionally, it was also a time of decreased business for the nation because of an economic depression.

Later, just after the turn of the century, the Revenue Cutter Service faced these issues again when President Taft pushed for improvements in the efficiency of governmental organizations. This time the Navy was more receptive to acquiring the cutters and enlisted men, but still did not want additional duties. Some of the missions

were beyond the scope of naval authority because they did not possess law enforcement powers, which meant some other organization would have to take on the burden.

Whatever agency wound up with the assignment would have to obtain vessels, thus negating any cost savings. No one wanted the Navy to reduce their ability to wage war and defend the nation so, by default; no other mission would have as high a priority. This meant assistance of mariners in distress would never get the same emphasis from the Navy that the cutter men placed on saving others. In addition, the Navy required more men to man ships of similar size, so that meant even more funding. The Revenue Cutter Service also served as the Navy's major reserve force that was always available for immediate integration. If this service went away, and the need ever arose (which it did a very short time later) for highly skilled mariners, it would take a very long time to recruit and train them. Despite these arguments, and the fact that the Revenue Marine consistently brought in more money than what it cost to run it, the service always seemed to have opponents ready to terminate the organization's existence.

The arguments listed above, coupled with the dramatic increase in the number of pleasure boats--which meant more accidents, more lives to be saved, and new regulations and legislature to enforce--and the public outcry for more safety and security at sea after the TITANIC disaster, all served to prolong the Revenue Cutter Service's life. Add to this the outbreak of The Great War in Europe and the nation's concern for its defense, and it should be clear that there existed a clear and present need for such a versatile service. Rather than parcel out the service's missions, it was decided to keep the organization intact, and to consolidate maritime law enforcement and safety concerns within one governmental agency, making it responsible for protective and preventative measures. On

20 January 1915, the U.S. Revenue Cutter Service and U.S. Lifesaving Service were merged to form a new agency, the U.S. Coast Guard.

A little over two years later, a short message “Plan One, Acknowledge” was sent, transferring the Coast Guard from the Treasury Department to the Navy, as the United States entered World War I. This is noteworthy in that it was the first time an advanced arrangement was agreed upon before bringing the service over. Almost immediately after the Coast Guard was formed, senior officers of both services began planning exercises that would have members of both services working together and to ensure Coast Guard personnel would be proficient in applicable matters. Very few of the plans materialized however, given the short time before the war broke out, the shortages of personnel for both services, and the rapid growth of the Navy, which kept it busy with other priorities.

There was no corresponding expansion of the Coast Guard though. It remained a force of approximately fifteen cutters of significance, numerous small boats, two hundred officers, and five thousand enlisted men.²² The service was called on to do its traditional missions, with increased vigilance and security, and to assist with the submarine menace. Some of the cutters were assigned convoy escort duties and went into battle against German submarines. Though most of the cutters did not have the endurance to remain with the larger naval combatant ships, they were still relatively quick and maneuverable, making them well suited for the task of deterring and chasing enemy submarines. Despite their smaller caliber guns, the cutters were still sufficiently armed to be a threat to the submarines of that era.

The other significant event for the service was the Espionage Act of 1917 in which the President was authorized to delegate to the Coast Guard the protection of ports

and waterfronts against sabotage. Since the waterways were a major source of revenue for the nation, they were placed under the control of the Treasury Department. Security of the major harbors were controlled by Coast Guard officers designated as the Captain of the Port, a title that was to only last for the duration of the war, but after resurrection, exists again today. The Captain of the Port was responsible for vessel movements, establishing anchorages, and enforcing special rules for explosive cargo. This extra burden placed a heavy load on the small organization since there was no increase in staffing levels.

By the outbreak of World War II, the Coast Guard had seen several changes. The most important of these was its growth to an organization approximately five times its size during the First World War. This was mainly because of the 1920 National Prohibition (Volstead) Act that made it illegal to make, sell, or transport alcohol beverages. Though whiskey was smuggled across the border from Canada, quite a bit came ashore near major cities after an ocean transit from other countries. The Coast Guard was enlarged considerably over the course of a few years to help fight what became known as the Rum War. Congress authorized the service to grow by another forty-five hundred more men that were to operate the additional vessels needed to stem the flow of alcohol. Twenty World War I vintage four-stack destroyers were taken out of the Navy's mothball fleet and quickly overhauled and refitted by inexperienced Coast Guard enlisted men. A select few, mostly the Chief water tenders and machinist mates, were lucky enough to receive four weeks of training from the Navy so at least someone would know how to operate the boilers. In addition to the destroyers, several hundred other boats of various sizes were built.

Of interesting note, during the Rum War, Coast Guardsmen learned some valuable skills that would well serve them, and the Navy, in the years to come. The first of these was the proficiency of running “darkened ship” all the time. This was necessary to avoid detection by the smugglers who, incidentally, also kept all lights off for fear of being discovered by the Coast Guard. The other abilities involved radio, cipher, and codes. The Coast Guard developed its own intelligence service to counter the tricks used by the Rum Runners.

In many ways, calling the prohibition years the “Rum Wars” is appropriate for the Coast Guard was up against a large and well-organized “enemy” who used developing tactics. In addition to carrying machine guns and other weapons that were used to shoot out Coast Guard searchlights and occasionally the Coast Guardsmen themselves, the smugglers used secret radio stations, a changing code, smoke-screens at sea to hide or double back in, newer, faster boats capable of running across shoals that were too shallow for even the Coast Guard, were all techniques that required the Coast Guard to adapt and transform as the men learned the basic principles of naval security applicable to combat.

The Rum War also gave rise to the Coast Guard’s aviation efforts. A little known fact is that the Coast Guard (actually one of its antecedent agencies – the Life Saving Service) had an integral part in the first flight made by Orville and Wilbur Wright in 1902. Located along a remote portion of North Carolina’s shores, a few bored members of the Kill Devil Lifeboat Station who were off duty or had nothing else better to do, often assisted the brothers with their contraption when they came to the beach during the summers to conduct tests and experiment with their craft. The photograph of the very first flight was actually taken by a Surfman from the station. Because of lean bud gets

though, it was quite a few more years before the Coast Guard as a service embraced aviation and the obvious benefits it brought. When appropriations increased dramatically to allow the service to counter the Rum Runners, funding appropriate for the growth in aviation was finally approved.



Figure 1. Signalman First Class Douglas Munro, USCG

Source: http://www.uscg.mil/hq/g-cp/history/CG_famous_photos_index.html, website. Munro entered the history books during the Guadalcanal campaign when, on a dangerous mission to evacuate Marines from behind enemy lines, he was killed in action. He is the only Coast Guardsman to ever be awarded the Medal of Honor. Circa 1942; no photo number; photographer unknown.



Figure 2. D-Day at Omaha Beach

Source: http://www.uscg.mil/hq/g-cp/history/CG_famous_photos_index.html, website. A Coast Guard-manned LCVP from the USS *Samuel Chase* disembarks troops of the U.S. Army's First Division on the morning of 6 June 1944 at Omaha Beach.
6 June 1944; no photo number; photographer unknown.

Though it had increased the number and size of many of its vessels and had a major hand in the pioneering efforts of aviation, the people themselves were the asset the Navy was most interested in to provide them significant reinforcement in war that would be fought across the two major oceans. The Coast Guard represented a source of highly trained men that would bring diversity to the Navy. Many of them had attended Navy schools and training programs, which meant they should be familiar enough with the way the larger service conducted operations, leading to an easy transition. Additionally, the men had a reputation for being brave and competent seamen who, with intimate knowledge of the coastline, fearlessly went to sea in small craft, no matter how rough or stormy, to rescue much larger vessels in distress. These men were to bring with them unique skills sorely needed in the larger service, such as expert small boat handling in

surf zones--an ability that could be the difference between success and failure for the amphibious landings that were the key to U.S. strategy. As it turned out, the Coast Guard participated in every amphibious operation undertaken.

Some of the cutters were to be used as escorts and for convoy duty again as in the last war, but many would also remain close to the coast to deter enemy submarines and to remain available for other Coast Guard missions, especially saving the lives of merchant mariners who were victims of torpedo attacks. Other cutters were to relieve the Navy of ocean weather station duties. The Coast Guard mission viewed by the Navy as the most important was port security. Port Security was placed in the hands of the Navy, but since the Coast Guard was part of the Navy in time of war, the Coast Guard retained the mission, much to the Navy's relief. Since the war was being fought in foreign lands, everything had to be transported there by ships. The ports were the critical points in the supply chain. Any problems in the harbors or along the waterfront could spell disaster for an operation and could seriously detract from America's war effort. Port Security was paramount and meant that the valuable war materials and men were to be protected at all costs. This meant more than just an increase in patrols to protect against sabotage, but inspections and regulation enforcement as well--peacetime aspects of the Coast Guard missions still applied. Constant presence forced mariners to pay attention to detail and avoid negligence that could cause an accident. The identity, location and movement of vessels were carefully monitored. Delays had to be avoided in order for the flow of supplies to continue as scheduled. For added security, an identification system was devised requiring the fingerprinting and issue of credentials to Longshoremen. The Espionage Act of 1917 had been resurrected in 1939 and was expanded to include the

right of the Coast Guard to seal the radios of vessels to prevent transmission of information sensitive in nature. In October of 1940, the Dangerous Cargo Act was passed which covered all material hazardous in nature in addition to explosives previously covered by the Espionage Act.

Though it was a huge burden for the Coast Guard (32,655 vessels of all description were boarded during the fiscal year 1939) one of the benefits to arise from the situation was the intelligence that was gathered and used for the good of the nation just a short time later. Before America's entry into the war, armed merchant vessels of all the belligerent nations were required to be inspected for verification, under international law, that their weapons were defensive in nature, otherwise they would be considered a man-o'-war and would have further restrictions imposed upon them. The Coast Guard officers and men who conducted the inspections took photographs and documented their findings. Some of the vessels had been boarded and inspected several times during the period immediately before the war. The changes to the vessels and the reasons for them were carefully noted and the information was useful when the nation herself entered the war.²³

To complement the Port Security actions conducted in the more developed areas and cities, the Coast Guard implemented the Beach Patrol. This security force used boats, motorized vehicles, horses, and even foot patrol to add to the coastal defense of the nation. Often conducted in remote areas, the patrols were used to deter and detect enemy vessels or submarines operating in coastal waters, to prevent and report enemy landings, to prevent communications between the shore and the enemy at sea, to prevent illegal access or sabotage to prohibited or restricted areas, and to rescue or otherwise assist survivors, victims, and crews of ships sunk by enemy action.

Proof of the need for such patrols came during the fog-shrouded night of 13 June 1942 when Seaman Second Class John C. Cullen came across three men on the beach as they came out of the water. It did not take long for him to ascertain that the men were German and had probably come ashore via raft from an enemy submarine. After accepting a bribe to convince the men that he would not report the incident, Seaman Cullen feigned his resumption of his patrol along the beach. Once out of ear shot and concealed by fog, he raced back to his station to gather more men and report the incident. When they returned to the location, the German men were gone, but careful examination revealed four buried boxes that contained explosives and incendiary devices. The contents of the boxes and the details of the encounter were immediately conveyed to the Federal Bureau of Investigation who, a short time later, apprehended the saboteurs.



Figure 3. Coast Guard Landing Craft

Source: <http://www.uscg.mil/hq/g-cp/comrel/factfile/> website. Coast Guard landing craft taking troops to Utah Beach during the Normandy Invasion, 1944.

After World War II, the Coast Guard was returned to the Treasury Department, and has not been incorporated into the Navy since. With the end of the war came an end to Port Security duties. While the Coast Guard was in charge of ports, not a single disaster occurred, but shortly after the agency stood down, a devastating explosion killed 561 people and caused extensive damage in Texas City, Texas on 16 April 1947. When the Korean War began a few years later, there was much concern for American harbors and their vulnerability to communist sabotage. On 9 August 1950, Congress passed the Magnuson Act that basically allowed the Espionage Act of 1917 and Dangerous Cargo act of 1940 to be used in times of peace or, more accurately, when the nation was not engaged in a declared war. With rhetoric surprisingly similar to that used in the period after 11 September 2001, the speech introducing the bill warned of dangers such as foreign vessels smuggling in atomic bombs or bacteria.²⁴ The responsibility for the ports almost immediately went to the Coast Guard. Once again, the small service shifted priorities and fully embraced its new mission.

Although it can take credit for having trained the South Korean Navy prior to the outbreak of war, during the Korean War, the Coast Guard did not have a major role in combat overseas. Instead, it was directed to increase its Search and Rescue capabilities in the Pacific to assist with military aircraft in distress over the ocean. It was also tasked to improve the radio and navigation systems that served aircraft and ocean-going vessels. These two missions were continued after the war, and along with the development of the Automated Merchant Vessel Reporting System (AMVER) wherein vessels routinely volunteered to provide the Coast Guard their positions, courses and speeds so that the closest one could be diverted to assist another vessel in distress, highlight the post World

War II emphasis placed on transportation safety that eventually led to the service's transfer to the Department of Transportation on 1 April 1967.



Figure 4. Marines show their appreciation

Source: http://www.uscg.mil/hq/g-cp/history/CG_famous_photos_index.html, website. Marines salute the Coast Guardsmen who put them ashore during the invasion of Guam, 1944 during World War II. Circa July 1944; no photo number; photographer unknown.

Before this transfer took place however, the Coast Guard went overseas with the Navy once again. During the war with Vietnam, the U.S. Navy lacked sufficient vessels with shallow draft that could operate in the littoral region. The “Swift” boats, worked well in close to shore and on the rivers, but with limited endurance, they lacked the ability to operate offshore in rougher waters. Concerned with the vessels being used by North Vietnam for supply and infiltration, the Navy turned to the Coast Guard for help. The Coast Guard sent numerous cutters and patrol boats crewed by experienced men that had considerable expertise in regards to interdiction of fishing vessels and other ships of

the like. Working closely with the Navy, an effective screen was established, sealing the maritime border, and denying the enemy access to the sea.

Though the Coast Guard did not go to war during the next two decades, it remained busy with a variety of missions. There were times when the demand for the small service exceeded its capabilities, and forced it to turn to the Navy for help. Examples of this include the Cuban exodus associated with the Camarioca and Mariel Boatlifts and the “Drug War.” The Navy provided ships in both instances to assist the Coast Guard.

The Coast Guard’s expeditionary role was resurrected during the Persian Gulf War against Iraq. Throughout Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm, the Coast Guard participated in Maritime Interception Operations (MIO) to enforce embargoes and United Nation Resolutions. The service performed numerous vessel inspections and assisted the Navy by providing Port Security Units to assist with shore-side and harbor protection. The Coast Guard’s greatest role in the Persian Gulf War however, was its response to the significant oil spills and deliberate release of petroleum products by the enemy. Posing a serious long-term threat to the environment that would also have considerable economic impact, the oil needed to be cleaned up as soon as possible. The Coast Guard was the only service or agency that had the capability to respond.

Though the Navy has no law enforcement authority, their ships and their sensors were of great use to the Coast Guard during the past decade. Despite the lack of the Coast Guard’s own assets, Naval vessels effectively provided a law enforcement presence when Coast Guard Tactical Law enforcement Teams (TACLETS) and Law Enforcement Detachments (LEDETS) are embarked. With their greater endurance, Naval vessels were

able to provide Coast Guard presence at greater distances and for longer periods. Such deployments have become common along the coasts of Mexico and South America, and reinforce the idea that the two services can assist each other during times of war and peace.

¹Howard V.L. Bloomfield, *The Compact History of The United States Coast Guard* (New York: Hawthorn Books, 1966), 107.

²Stephen H. Evans, *The United States Coast Guard 1790-1915: A Definitive History* (Annapolis: U.S. Naval Institute, 1949), 85.

³*Act of August 4, 1790* (1 Stat. L., 145, 175).

⁴Bloomfield, 8.

⁵James D. Hessman, “Three Decades of Mission Creep,” *Sea Power* 41, Iss. 9 (Sep 1998): 47-48.

⁶Bloomfield, 5-11.

⁷*Act of July 1, 1797* (1 Stat. L., 621).

⁸*Act of March 2, 1799* (1 Stat. L., 627, 699).

⁹Bloomfield, 21.

¹⁰Evans, 21.

¹¹*Act of April 18, 1814.*

¹²Bloomfield, 27-33

¹³Ibid., 34.

¹⁴Ibid., 35.

¹⁵Gene Gurney, *The United States Coast Guard: A Pictorial History* (New York: Crown Publishers, 1973), 19.

¹⁶Walter C. Capron, *The U.S. Coast Guard* (New York: Franklin Watts, 1965), 34.

¹⁷Bloomfield, 57.

¹⁸Evans, 28-29.

¹⁹Bloomfield, 32.

²⁰Evans, 29.

²¹Ibid., 35.

²²H. R. Kaplan and James F. Hunt, *This is The Coast Guard* (Cambridge, MD: Cornell Maritime Press, 1972), 44.

²³Frank C Herold, “The Coast Guard As A Naval Asset,” *U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings* 67, no. 7 (July 1941): 969-976.

²⁴Douglas Kroll, “Security Isn’t Free,” *U.S. Naval Institute of Naval History* (February 2002): 40-43.

CHAPTER 3

THE COAST GUARD'S RELATIONSHIP WITH THE NAVY

The Navy and Coast Guard commit to shared purpose and common effort focused on tailored operational integration of our multi-mission platforms, meeting the entire spectrum of America's twenty-first century maritime needs. While we will remain separate services, each with a proud heritage, we recognize the need to work more effectively together. We describe the process for closer cooperation as the "National Fleet," a concept that synchronizes planning, training and procurement to provide the highest level of maritime capabilities for the nation's investment...The Navy and Coast Guard will work together to build a National Fleet of multi-missions surface combatants and cutters to maximize our effectiveness across all naval and maritime missions. The Navy and Coast Guard will coordinate surface ship planning, information systems integration, and research and development, as well as expand joint concepts of operations, logistics, training, exercises and deployments. The Coast Guard and Navy will work together to acquire and maintain future ships that mutually support and complement each service's roles and missions.¹

Joint Navy/Coast Guard Policy Statement

Several times during the nation's history, the U.S. Navy and the U.S. Coast Guard have been viewed as competitors. Both are obviously maritime services that operate warships with seemingly overlapping missions. In fact, both services have a history of participating in blockades, supporting amphibious operations while providing fire support from the sea, and protecting merchant ships and commerce from enemy raiders and warships. This has led to several studies and investigations, often at the behest of Congress, to discern the feasibility of merging the two services. The usual expectation or suggestion was that the larger Navy should absorb the smaller service. In 1911, when presidential direction mandated the review of redundant government agencies, the Cleveland Commission recommended the absorption of the Revenue Cutter Service into

the Navy. Secretary of the Navy George Meyer responded with the following view on the Navy's war-fighting role:

[While] the chief functions of the Revenue-Cutter Service can be performed by the Navy . . . this cannot be done as stated in the Cleveland report in the regular performance of their military duties. All duties which interfere with the training of the [Navy's] personnel for war are irregular and in a degree detrimental to the efficiency of the fleet.²

Naturally, these studies caused a great deal of anxiety and concern to those involved. The Treasury Department did not want to lose its fleet, no matter how small, since it was exceptionally successful at bringing in the revenue in addition to so many other duties. Secretary of the Treasury Franklin MacVeagh responded to the Cleveland Commission's findings with the following:

The Navy could never give the kind and degree of attention that is required of the Revenue Cutter Service and its officers and men trained in their particular duties for 120 years. The Revenue Cutter Service's work is alien to the work of the Navy, alien to the spirit of the Navy, and alien, I think, to its professional capacities and instincts – alien certainly to its training tastes.³

The closest the two services came to a permanent merging though, was a few years later at the close of the First World War. The Coast Guard did not return to the Treasury Department right away because of the Navy Department's desire to retain control of all government vessels. This time, the proponents were not only members of the Congress and the Navy, but many officers of the Coast Guard as well. They preferred to remain with the Navy because of the improved promotion opportunities in a larger service. They also desired the better pay and benefits in addition to the higher social status and recognition that Navy personnel were afforded. Only after almost a year long, difficult struggle and successful lobbying by the politically adept Secretary Treasurer and

the Coast Guard's Commandant did the small service returned to the Treasury Department.⁴

The looming threat of merging with the Navy or even outright disbandment, along with various other pressures of course, often led the Commandant of the Coast Guard at the given time to seek ways to protect his service and ensure its existence as an autonomous organization. Sometimes this meant literal divestment of any semblance or likeness to the Navy with drastic changes to uniform policies as in 1835 when Secretary Levi Woodbury suggested changes that included the removal of epaulets and exclusion of blue uniforms.⁵ Though this may seem petty or trivial, lest one thinks that the mandate was an anomaly or a “sign of the times” if you will, similar decisions have been made several times since, with the most recent being in 1976, when the Commandant of the Coast Guard issued a wide-sweeping directive to completely change the service members’ apparel from the approved navy blue and khaki uniforms and double-breasted jackets to the much lighter shades of blue and suit coats still worn today. The much joked about irony of this peculiar decision is that all it accomplished was to further confuse those not intimately familiar with the Coast Guard and to make the members of the organization dress like they were in the Air Force rather than in the Navy. Before 1976, when Coast Guardsmen were occasionally mistaken for Navy sailors, at least they were recognized as members of a sea-going service.

Some decisions made by commandants to give the Coast Guard a distinctive identity and image were much more important and had significantly more impact than superfluous uniform decrees. Apparently aware of the publicity the Coast Guard was receiving because of its enormous efforts during the *Exxon Valdez* disaster in Prince

William Sound, Alaska, the Admiral who became Commandant in 1990 shortly after the accident quickly went about changing perceptions of the service.⁶ Recognizing the public's concern with environmental issues, heavy emphasis was placed on the role the Coast Guard has with vessel inspections and investigations. Within a short period, the licensing and regulatory functions of the service seemed to grow in importance while the better-known, traditional missions of the service, which included national defense, the drug interdiction aspect of law enforcement, and even search and rescue, were downgraded drastically.

A seemingly small action was the modification of the Officer Evaluation Report (OER), which had the “Warfare Expertise” dimension removed. This measurement of expertise was viewed in some circles as giving an unfair advantage to sea-going and operationally oriented officers over their brethren who were stationed ashore in staff jobs. For many officers, it should not have mattered much for they often rotated between staff billets and those aboard cutters. Those who spent the preponderance of their career in the marine safety field without sea time though, were potentially at risk to not compete as well during officer promotion boards. The issue quickly became contentious, with rumors circulating that even senior officers were afraid to wear their hard-earned aviator wings or Cuttermen pins while in the service’s headquarters building or anywhere near the Commandant.

The other major action that the Commandant took which was in no way small or trivial was the drastic reduction in the warfare capacity of the fleet’s High Endurance Cutters. The Coast Guard would no longer be able to support or augment the Navy with anti-submarine or long distance anti-surface ship capability. Not only were the newly

acquired Harpoon missiles removed, but so were the torpedoes and all of the sonar equipment as well. Additionally, the crews would no longer train with such equipment and would not maintain qualifications either. The actual rate (known in some of the other military services as an MOS) of the Sonar Technician was done away with, while the aptitude and competence requirements for other ratings were altered in regards to be more in alignment with the changes to the service. One of the associated affects was the large decrease in the number of Coast Guard personnel sent to train with the Navy or to receive education from the larger service's schools. The Coast Guard was also unable to participate with much of a role in various joint military exercises and refrained from getting involved with national defense and peacetime engagements despite invitations and requests from the Department of Defense. Overall, the interaction between the Coast Guard and the other services, especially the Navy, was severely curtailed.

No serious effort to bridge this large rift between the two services was made until 1995 when, facing serious cutbacks in both personnel and funding, the Coast Guard sought to demonstrate its services and importance as an organization in as many ways as possible and seemingly embraced, or at least latched-on to, its former military role and involvement with the nation's defense. On 03 October 1995, Secretary of Defense William Perry and Secretary Federico Pena signed a Memorandum of Agreement between the Department of Defense and Department of Transportation pertaining to the use of the U.S. Coast Guard and its resources in support of the National Military Strategy. In addition to explaining the specialized capabilities of the Coast Guard, the agreement includes annexes that can be adapted over time to suit the needs of the nation.⁷

Further bridging the gap is the National Fleet Joint Policy Statement signed 21 September 1998 and revalidated in 2001. This statement derives from the shared need to improve the bulk of both the Navy and Coast Guard's inventory of equipment. The organizations comprehend and state that they are distinct services with their own assets. By making a concerted effort to procure systems that will facilitate interoperability, both services admit the need to work more effectively together. The services are realizing that they have complementary capabilities and that cooperation is in their own best interests for it greatly enhances national security. Coordinating and planning operations, engaging in training, and working on logistics together, fosters synergistic results that will have positive impact on the nation's maritime needs.⁸

Once again, as throughout history, the arguments have often been solved, and the decision to keep the two services separate has been made, after careful examination of the missions of each service and how they are accomplished. Both services were charged long ago with the critical responsibility and overall purpose of protecting the nation, specifically its maritime interests. As it turned out, the smaller service, initially known as the Revenue Cutter Service, and later as the Coast Guard, focused on protection of the maritime through collecting revenues and saving lives, whether through direct action or through regulation, while the Navy protected the nation through a strategy of offense, becoming the dominant master of the high seas with exceptional war-fighting capabilities.

While the majority of the world's navies primarily just guard their country's coast, the U.S. Navy does not. Even though it is responsible for maritime defense of the homeland, the Navy is a power projection force with offensive capabilities. The Navy is

first, and foremost, a war-fighting instrument. Despite their differing views, much of what Alfred T. Mahan and Julian Corbett wrote about the “fleet in being” and the importance of naval power and command of the sea still applies today.⁹ The Navy’s command of the seas assures access to areas of potential conflict and allows the Navy to provide support for the Joint Force.¹⁰ Whether it is to shape events or to respond to a crisis, the Navy’s ability to project power with its forward presence is an important strategic element. The simple fact, that the United States has the most powerful navy, influences how other nations deal with America. In merely a few days, a fleet of the world’s most potent vessels can be relocated to demonstrate resolve and commitment. Their forward presence serves as deterrence for potential enemies, while reassuring allies and coalition members. Naval ships represent U.S. sovereignty and democratic ideals. The Navy is critical to the nation’s foreign policy. Any additional duties that detract from the Navy’s ability to wage war are detrimental, counter productive, and therefore should be avoided.

The Coast Guard, on the other hand, has many missions aside from that of naval warfare. Nevertheless, with its shallow draft cutters, it is often thought of as the nation’s shallow water navy. This line of thinking is misleading and may misrepresent the Coast Guard’s abilities. Cutters are not equipped with missiles, torpedoes, or vertical launch systems. Most do not have air search radars, and none have sonar. Only one class has a Close-in Weapon System (CWIS) for any semblance of air defense capabilities. Though they serve a special purpose, even the largest cutters do not possess the firepower of even the smallest frigate in service with the Navy. Navy vessels are designed and built for combat, giving them an intimidating presence. Any U.S. Navy combatant is more capable

of shooting down aircraft, countering enemy submarines, and fending off surface ships at long ranges.¹¹ Firepower, however, is not necessarily, what the Coast Guard needs to contribute in regards to naval warfare.

As the global situation changes and so do the menaces, the Navy must transform to remain a viable solution to America's problems. Given the cost in time and money that it takes to develop and build a modern warship, the Navy must mind its force structure and balance its fleet to be capable of defeating a multitude of threats, including conventional and asymmetrical ones. Though asymmetrical enemies are a viable threat today, the Navy must beware of the rivals and peers that will arise in the future to challenge America's maritime dominance. This presents a sizeable challenge to the Navy.

With an austere budget and aging ships designed to counter the Soviet threat during the Cold War, which ones are to be kept and what types are to be developed for an uncertain future? The Navy needs to be able to project power ashore and dominate in foreign littorals, but operation of warships in coastal regions incurs a high degree of peril. The Navy cannot afford to risk too much of its fleet in shallow water engagements because it needs to remain dominant across the oceans, maintain sea lines of communication, and defend the homeland's maritime. The dilemma will only become that more taxing as the number of ships in the Navy's inventory further dwindle over time.

For the Navy, an answer to this dilemma may lie in the use of the Coast Guard. As former Commandant of the Coast Guard, Admiral James M. Loy stated, "With a 600-ship Navy, 40 or so Coast Guard cutters were virtually an after-thought. With a Navy of 116 or fewer surface combatants, and in a world plagued with regional instability and

strife, however, our 40 major cutters along with several hundred coastal patrol boats take on new significance.”¹²

As stated before, Coast Guard cutters currently do not have the weapons capability of their naval counterparts, but that is because they have, for the most part, been designed for different missions. Traditionally they have been built for the Coast Guard’s major role in maritime enforcement. This means, relative to their sophisticated, technologically advanced naval counterparts, that cutters may be more suitable to counter low-end threats. It is not that they are expendable, but rather that in terms of cost, they are less expensive to maintain, have smaller crews, and require a lesser degree of technical training and proficiency to operate. History has shown that even though they are relatively small, they can be used for diverse tasks, especially in littorals, to ease the load on their naval counterparts.

One assignment that it would seem the Navy could use the Coast Guard’s assistance with is Maritime Interdiction Operations (MIO). The concept of conducting Visit, Board, Search, and Seizure (VBSS) missions to enforce United Nation resolutions is akin to the law enforcement boardings performed by the Coast Guard on an everyday basis. Routinely, the Coast Guard is engaged with detecting suspect vessels, conducting surveillance, maneuvering to intercept, and delivering boarding teams to enforce U.S. laws. The training Coast Guard personnel receive to perform this duty, lends well to the MIO mission. Using highly trained and experienced boarding teams can improve effectiveness and overall efficiency. If properly employed, a Coast Guard cutter could be used in place of a Navy combatant so it could perform a different mission or be

positioned to respond to a higher threat. The impact of deploying such a cutter and its accompanying helicopter for this expeditionary role however, merits scrutiny.

The cutter, though it may only be overseas for six months, is involved with six months of workups before departure, and then needs several months upon return for maintenance, training, and reconfigurations. During the workups, the cutter's aged power plant is worked on to preclude the likely hood of engineering casualties while ensuring it is as ready as possible to run all engines full time to keep up with the fast Navy fleet. This means additional funding will be needed as well. The crew is augmented with personnel from other units as necessary to ensure the cutter is fully manned because once underway with the Navy, whose ships are staffed with considerably more people, the cutter will be forced to stay at a higher condition of readiness at all control stations than is customary. Since cutters normally operate independently, the crew must undergo extensive training to prepare for steaming in formation and other battle group maneuvers. In addition, with fuel consumption much higher than normal, the crew must be adept at underway replenishment, refueling every other day. Furthermore, the cutter will have had its communications suite overhauled and improved, requiring crew instruction with the equipment as well as with Navy message and reporting requirements and procedures. In short, everything possible is done to mitigate potential problems that could reduce the military readiness of the unit or impede the rest of the fleet.

The embarked helicopter and aircrew come from an air station that will certainly feel the effects of the missing assets. The pilots and flight mechanics will no longer be a part of the duty rotation and will not be available to perform their ground jobs and collateral duties, meaning the load will further increase for those remaining behind. This

is considerable for most air stations normally only have four or five helicopters.

Additionally, the deployed crew must consist of at least one relatively senior, experienced pilot, and technically proficient mechanics from each of the enlisted aircrew ratings. This often means a department head and several key players from the hangar deck. Unlike the cutter, the air station crew is not augmented, nor does the unit get a replacement helicopter. This forces the unit to operate under less than desirable conditions for a considerably long time.

Though the HH-65 Dolphin has quite successfully performed countless missions for the Coast Guard, the wisdom of sending the helicopter with a cutter on such a deployment is questionable, for the Dolphin is limited in some of its capabilities in comparison with its naval counterparts. To begin with, the HH-65, a short-range recovery asset, has considerably less range than even the smallest helicopters used by the Navy. It also has minimal payload or passenger capacity. Though the aircrews have become incredibly proficient at regularly operating the helicopter at its power margins, the laws of physics still apply--in order to take more weight, whether it is passengers or cargo, less fuel is taken.

To illustrate this point, the helicopter, with its maximum permissible gross weight at takeoff being 9,200 pounds, can have a crew of three and approximately eighteen-hundred pounds of gas--the maximum amount of fuel the tanks can carry, or it can take off with a crew of three, the maximum of four passengers, and approximately one thousand pounds of fuel if each passenger, wearing appropriate survival gear, weighs two hundred pounds. In certain weather conditions, however, the engines are not powerful enough to safely operate the aircraft at its maximum gross weight. The normal tradeoff is

to carry less fuel to be lighter and to have more power. If deployed to a region of extremely warm temperatures such as the Persian Gulf, the Dolphin cannot operate from the cutter's flight deck for much more than twenty minutes because of the power reserve requirements observed for safety concerns and risk management. These concerns are not unfounded, for the Dolphin has a history of engine problems and lacks the ability to hover on one engine should the other fail. This, of course, means extensive preparatory maintenance before departure. With the limited room for storage available aboard the cutter and because it is the only helicopter of its type in theater, an extensive logistics chain must be developed in advance to ensure timely part availability.

Actual deployments of the Coast Guard's cutters with the Navy have revealed that, despite all of the arduous preparations, the level of interoperability was still wanting. A major concern was the lack of capability for encrypted communications. The cutter was only able to monitor two channels, while the Navy desired the ships in the battle group to be listening to all six or seven channels being used. Additionally, the cutter's radio range was too short, further hampering communications.

Other limitations revealed include those of the cutter's crew--not with their performance, but with their limited numbers. Depending on the size and number of ships to be boarded, the VBSS mission is usually a labor-intensive operation. The cutter's crew is stretched thin while conducting the boardings and radio queries in addition to seeing to the increased needs and demands of their own vessel that normally are not present when not steaming with the Navy. Aboard cutters, the crewmembers each have numerous roles and duties to fulfill. Members away conducting a boarding are not available to man their critical position on the flight deck, for example, when it comes time for flight operations.

This presents a demanding challenge and forces the prudent Commanding Officer to decide in advance, which operations capabilities are to be kept and which is to be foregone. Additionally, the Commanding Officer of the three hundred seventy eight foot long WHEC is a Captain (O6) with considerably less experience and naval warfighting skills than the more junior Commanding Officers of the much larger and capable destroyers that had Commanders (O5) in charge. This outwardly minor fact led to uncomfortable, if not improper, situations wherein seniority had to be overlooked because of a lack of tactical knowledge. This is not meant to be disparaging to the cutter Captains, for it must be remembered that in order to be selected for such a position requires an officer to have demonstrated a considerable amount of skill and knowledge in areas of expertise other than Naval Warfare, such as Law Enforcement. The Commanding Officer of a cutter has extensive jurisdiction and broad law enforcement authority. Command of such a cutter is therefore normally only given to the most deserving officers with impeccable judgment.

Another factor was the cutter's size and physical capabilities. Though a three hundred-seventy-eight foot cutter is large to a Coast Guardsmen, it is diminutive compared to even what the Navy calls "small boys"--their frigates and destroyers, which can be over two hundred feet longer than the cutter. While the Navy ships could recover the HH-65, the cutter was unable to have any of the navy's helicopters land on its deck. The cutter also held much less fuel, food, and other essentials, and therefore needed to engage in underway replenishment (UNREP) for re-supply more frequently, usually every other day whereas the destroyers needed to UNREP once a week. Size is also a factor in what kind of seas the fleet can operate, for the small cutter finds itself "out of

limits” quicker than the other ships, meaning it cannot launch or recover its helicopter, and may have to reduce its speed and change course to avoid sustaining damage from the waves. If the fleet wants to stay together, the little cutter can have some severe, negative impacts on the fleet’s efficiency and capabilities. From many aspects, the cutter appears less capable than the Navy ship it is to replace.

These facts have not gone unnoticed by senior leaders of the services. Coast Guard Admiral Ray Riutta, as Assistant Commandant for Operations, expressing concerns, said, “When Coast Guard and Navy ships and aircraft operate together, the Coast Guard must be adequately equipped and trained so we are an asset and not a burden to the naval commander. The biggest challenge I have as chief of Coast Guard operations is to make sure that I do not field assets that are so slow, defenseless, and technologically outdated as to be albatrosses around the necks of the Navy’s forces with which we sail.”¹³

Admiral Vern Clark, while serving as the Chief of Naval Operations (CNO), endorsed the National Fleet concept signed by his predecessor and stated, “I stand four-square behind the arrangements and agreements in place and the Navy’s commitment to the Coast Guard . . . We need to build as much combat capability into the Coast Guard as possible.”¹⁴

Another mission the Coast Guard is well suited to perform for the Navy is Port Security. The Coast Guard is the recognized leader in port security at home, and many of its practices are suitable overseas as well. Coast Guard units can assist the Navy with protection of foreign ports and shipping. Escorting merchant shipping and controlling vessel movements are actions the service performs on a routine basis at home. The same applies for coastal and river patrols. Employing the experienced personnel of the Coast

Guard to assist with such endeavors could only enhance overall efficiency. This is important for some argue that the Coast Guard should not be overseas conducting these missions.

Over the years, budget and personnel cuts, reduced unit staffing, and the variety of missions themselves, have all served to stretch the Coast Guard to its limits. Small boat units, air stations, cutters, and marine safety offices were always busy conducting Search and Rescue, Law enforcement, environmental protection, and a whole host of other missions. Homeland Security requirements places an additional load on the force. During periods of heightened alert, some missions are given less priority and in some cases are delayed or not completed at all. Removing assets and personnel to send them elsewhere widens the gap and certainly has impacts that reduce overall effectiveness. Maintenance gets off schedule, inspections are not performed, and the assets deteriorate at an expedited rate. If new equipment is not provided earlier than scheduled, the situation will certainly get worse before it improves. Additionally, personnel do not perform necessary training and risk exposure to additional danger because of fatigue. All this has not escaped attention from politicians, who question the Coast Guard's expeditionary role.

As a result of this pressure, the Navy has created its own mobile security force that is deployable to wherever friendly shore infrastructure does not exist or to wherever there is need for increased force protection. With an organic capability such as this available to the Navy, it can be argued that it does not make sense for the Coast Guard to send its own port security units, patrol boats, and cutters overseas, especially when there is a bona fide need for them on the home front. The fact is, though, that it takes elements

from both services to properly perform all of the duties associated with Port Operations, Security, and Defense (POSD). The Coast Guard, for example, provides Port Security Units (PSU) that have boats and highly trained personnel ready to deploy anywhere in the world within ninety-six hours. The Navy, on the other hand, provides Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD) units and personnel trained in Mobile Inshore Undersea Warfare (MIUW).

The Coast Guard's expeditionary role includes more than just Maritime Interception Operations (MIO) and Port Security though. It is obviously the service of choice when it comes to conducting maritime Search and Rescue (SAR). The Coast Guard is also well suited for Non-combatant Evacuation Operations (NEO). Using the Coast Guard to conduct such missions may free other assets to perform duties more in line for what they are designed for. An Aegis class cruiser, for example, may be needed to provide air defense for ground forces close to shore. In any event, there are three missions that are beyond the U.S. Navy's capabilities and can only be conducted by the Coast Guard.

One of these missions is Ice Breaking. Though it has not been an item of concern in recent conflicts, the potential that it will be in the future remains. The need or timing of military action may necessitate winter operations. In certain areas may mean that rivers, bays, and harbors ice over. Merchant and supply shipping would not be able to get through, and operations close to shore would be restricted. Though a Polar Class Ice Breaker may not be needed, the 140-foot and 65-foot class of cutters would prove invaluable, especially if there was no host nation support

Another mission unique to the Coast Guard is Aids to Navigation (ATON). The repair, replacement, and maintenance of various navigational aids is important not only to the U.S. Navy, but to the navies of all coalition members as well. Additionally, merchant vessels need well-marked channels for humanitarian aid arrivals and supplies vital to military objectives. Providing a clearly marked seaway contributes significantly to the security of vessels operating in theater.

The other mission that the Coast Guard performs with considerable expertise is Environmental Response Operations. With National Strike Force teams capable of short notice, worldwide deployment and cutters with spill containment systems, the Coast Guard can mitigate the damage caused by spills of petroleum products and other hazardous materials. Operation Desert Storm is an excellent example that illustrates the need for this capability. The enemy deliberately released a considerable amount of oil that, if not contained by the Coast Guard, would have had been an ecological and economical disaster for the Persian Gulf region.

Deploying the Coast Guard to assist with overseas operations lends diversity to the force. Coast Guard personnel have unique skill sets and expertise in areas that are foreign to the other services. In addition, some of the assets and equipment that the Coast Guard employs is exclusive to the small service. These resources and skills, used regularly during day-to-day operations conducted at home, can be very valuable and relevant for military and engagement scenarios abroad. Without a doubt, if used properly, the Coast Guard's can greatly contribute to the National Security Strategy. Table 2 below highlights some of the Coast Guard's capabilities that enhance America's expeditionary operations.

Table 2. Key Capabilities for Joint and Multi National Operations

- Port Security Units
- Harbor Defense Commands
- Coastal Patrol Boats
- Major Cutters with Embarked Helicopters
- Patrol and Logistics Support Aircraft
- Maritime Interception/Boarding Teams
- Shipboard Helicopter Detachments for U.S. Navy and Other-Country Warships
- Environment Protection Teams
- Aids to Navigation Teams
- Search and Rescue Units

Source: James M. Loy, “Shaping America’s Joint Maritime Forces: The Coast Guard in the 21st Century,” *JFQ* 18 (spring 1998): 9-16.

¹National Fleet, A Joint Navy/Coast Guard Policy Statement , 21 September 1998, signed by the Chief of Naval Operations and the Commandant of the Coast Guard

²H.R. Doc. No. 670 62 Cong., 2 Sess., “Economy and Efficiency in the Government Service” (being a “Message of the President of the United States transmitting Reports of the Commission on Economy and Efficiency”); (Govt. Printing Office, Wash., D.D., 1912), 381. Also, Robert Erwin Johnson, *Guardians of the Sea: History of the United States Coast Guard, 1915 – Present* (Annapolis, MD: U.S. Naval Institute Press, 1987), 20.

³Irving H. King, *The Coast Guard Expands, 1865 – 1915* (Annapolis, MD: U.S. Naval Institute Press, 1996), 232.

⁴Walter C. Capron, *The U.S. Coast Guard* (New York: Franklin Watts, 1965), 63.

⁵Howard V.L. Bloomfield, *The Compact History of The United States Coast Guard* (New York: Hawthorn Books, 1966), 32.

⁶Captain Bruce Stubbs, “Whipsawing the Service,” *U.S. Naval Proceedings* 128, no. 4 (April 2002): 52-53.

⁷Secretary of Defense William Perry and Secretary Federico Pena, *Memorandum of Agreement Between the Department of Defense and Department of Transportation on the Use of U.S. Coast Guard Capabilities and resources in Support of the National Military Strategy*, 03 October 1995. Hereafter cited as DON/DOT MOA 95.

⁸James M. Loy, “The Coast Guard Is Maritime Security,” *U.S. Naval Proceedings* 124, no. 12 (Dec 1998): 29.

⁹Alfred Thayer Mahan, *The influence of Sea Power upon History, 1660-1783* (1890; repr. London: Methuen, 1965). Also, Julian S. Corbett, *Some principles of Maritime Strategy*, ed. Eric J. Grove (1911; repr. Annapolis, Md.:Naval Institute Press, 1988).

¹⁰Daniel Gourge and Adrienne J. Murphy, “This one will be Different,” *Sea Power* 44, no. 4 (April 2001): 95.

¹¹DON/DOT MOA 95.

¹²James M. Loy, “Shaping America’s Joint Maritime Forces: The Coast Guard in the 21st Century,” *Joint Forces Quarterly* No. 18 (Spring 1998): 14.

¹³Scott C. Truver, “A Navy-Coast Guard Renaissance? Safeguarding Maritime Security In The 21st Century,” *Armed Forces Journal International*, November 1999, 36.

¹⁴Scott C. Truver, “The Common-Sense Case for Deepwater Where No Coast Guard Program Has gone Before...,” *Sea Power* 44, no. 4 (April 2001): 82.

CHAPTER 4

JOINT RELATIONSHIPS OF THE COAST GUARD

Defending our Nation against its enemies is the first and fundamental commitment of the Federal Government. Today, that task has changed dramatically. Enemies in the past needed great armies and great industrial capabilities to endanger America. Now, shadowy networks of individuals can bring great chaos and suffering to our shores for less than it costs to purchase a single tank. Terrorists are organized to penetrate open societies and turn the power of modern technologies against us. To defeat this threat we must make use of every tool in our arsenal—military power, better homeland defenses, law enforcement, intelligence, and vigorous efforts to cut off terrorist financing.¹

The National Security Strategy of the United States of America

Though the Cold War is over and the chance of global nuclear war has been greatly reduced, there are still significant threats to the nation. Because the U.S. military is such a powerful and capable force, potential adversaries and enemies are more likely to seek new ways to harm America. Rather than engage in conventional warfare and confront U.S. military strengths, vulnerabilities will be sought and attacked. In the near future, asymmetric threats will be the foe, rather than a regional or global power. Transnational menaces like drug trafficking, illegal immigration and terrorism are some of the challenges the nation faces.

A look at the Coast Guard's historic and current maritime role and naval abilities shows that the organization is crucial to America's security. With otherwise unprotected ports and littoral regions, the nation's enemies, be they terrorists or criminals, would have easier access to a key piece of the national infrastructure--the nation's maritime transportation network. As it is, the Coast Guard, with its limited, aging resources, is stretched thin and is hard pressed to adequately cover the nation's 95,000 miles of

coastline; 10,000 miles of navigable rivers; 361 ports; and the world's largest exclusive economic zone, extending out to sea 200 miles from the shore, including 3.4 million square miles of ocean.²

Table 3. Maritime Security Challenges And Threats

- Smuggling of narcotics, illegal aliens, unauthorized technology transfers, and import of untaxed cargos
- Growing complexities of multi-flagged, multi-national maritime/shipping corporations
- Violations of sanction restrictions placed by the United Nations or other international bodies
- Destabilizing arms trafficking
- Illegal exploitation or contamination of the Maritime Food Supply
- Circumvention or violations of environmental protection laws
- Piracy, terrorism, and crime and violence at sea
- Sudden, uncontrolled mass migration
- Direct Military threats to Sealift Support and Port Security needed to sustain military operations

Source: World Maritime Challenges, 1997. Office of Naval Intelligence

The United States' economy is inextricably tied to its internal waterways and coastal regions. In the year 2003, 7.3 million cruise ship passengers, 1.04 billion tons of domestic cargo, and over 318 billion gallons of petroleum product transited American waterways. At least 1.5 million people are employed in various capacities involving maritime and port industries with another 300,000 connected to the commercial and recreational fishing industry. Without constant and consistent access to the ocean, the nation's economy and prosperity would quickly falter.³

To highlight the vulnerability of the trade and transportation system, consider the port of Long Beach, California. There, a single pier that is used for offloading maritime

crude oil shipments supplies what amounts to approximately 25 percent of the states consumption.⁴ On average, the state has no more than a two-day supply in storage. If something should happen to this pier, the result could be devastating.

A review of the west coast longshoremen strike during the summer of 2002 underscores the importance of ocean access for the nation. Foreign trade has quadrupled in the last 20 years and now equals about 20 percent of the nation's economic activity. 95 percent of overseas cargo comes through U.S. ports. Trade through West Coast Customs districts reached \$567-billion in 2000. That is almost one-third of the nation's international trade. A quick examination reveals that closing twenty-nine major Pacific ports could cost an estimated \$1-billion a day. According to the Pacific Maritime Association, which represents shipping lines and sea terminal operators, a 10-day shutdown could cost \$19.4-billion. Even if Puget Sound, for example, shut down for only a single day, the cost would be \$280 million.⁵ The financial impact here would be caused by just a stoppage of work. A major difference between a terrorist attack and a strike is that once a strike is over, the infrastructure is still in place and ready for immediate use. An attack that causes damage may take much more time to recover from. Thus far, the actual cost of 9/11 is uncertain, but it is estimated to have already caused a negative economic impact of at least a $\frac{3}{4}$ trillion-dollars, and the figure is still climbing.⁶ Prevention of the next attack is paramount.

Knowing that the trade and transportation systems are extremely vulnerable, and knowing their importance to the nation, it is not only a wonder, but is also ironic that \$100 billion can be so quickly ear-marked for a national ballistic missile defense system to counter weapons that very few potential enemies posses, yet it has been a struggle

since the nation's inception to budget sufficient funds for port protection, an area any enemy could readily access.⁷ For the Coast Guard, emphasis on Homeland Security is already overwhelming and calls for the deployment of too few units over too many operational areas. Over the next few years, as the cruise ship industry doubles in size, the 17 million recreational boats expand to even greater numbers, and more and more nations encroach upon the United States Exclusive Economic Zone to harvest fish as the world's stock depletes rapidly, the Coast Guard will probably still be short on assets, personnel, and funding. Additional burdens will arise and demands on the small service will continue to grow in other areas as use of the sea increases. This will require the Coast Guard to marshal limited resources to cover various mission areas.

Albeit there are now more than forty-three employment codes for the abstract of operations report that units use to document and record asset utilization, the Coast Guard's three main areas of concern can be summed up as defense, justice, and transportation. Luckily, these are not mutually exclusive, rather overlapping. For example, illegal narcotic trafficking is a justice issue, but the methods used to curtail and apprehend criminals can be applied to stopping terrorists, a defense issue. Thorough law enforcement and transportation regulations and enforcement reduces avenues of approach available to terrorists and criminals alike. This point is all the more relevant in the wake of the 11 March 2004 terrorist bombing of the trains in Madrid where foreign sources revealed the terrorists received their funding through the sale of illegal narcotics.⁸ Both the State Department and the Drug Enforcement Agency have also reported on the threat of narcoterrorism and that terrorist groups are receiving money from drug sales in South America and Afghanistan.⁹

The transnational dangers the nation faces have always been, until recently, considered crimes. Now, however, the distinction between war and crime has become difficult to delineate. The current presidential administration has made it clear that the actions of September 11, 2001 were acts of war. America has since, in fact, declared war on terrorism. Without a specific nation-state to target though, and as the terrorists disperse to numerous locations, the prosecution of the war may, in time, be more in alignment with the way one fights crime. Officer presence, development of sources, evidence gathering, issue of warrants, and if necessary, a raid to seize contraband and arrest the criminals, may all have parallels in the military.

Another issue tied to this is that administrations change every four to eight years, meaning that policy can change as well. If the economy improves and no attacks happen on American soil, the emphasis and views on terrorism may change. Whether it is because of politics or because of a bona fide need to counter a growing regional or international power, efforts of the Department of Defense may shift away from asymmetric enemies and refocus on major force on force engagements. Even if the “war on terrorism” subsides, and the act of terrorism is once again viewed by the majority as a crime, the transnational threats will still exist, and a force will still be needed to counter that threat. A key agency in that force, now or in the future, is the Coast Guard.

The Coast Guard is uniquely positioned in that it is both a law enforcement and military organization. As an established military force, Coast Guard vessels are considered warships and therefore have rights and authorities accorded by international law, making them useful instruments of national defense and representative of U.S. sovereignty. Title 14 of the U.S. Code also mandates and authorizes the Coast Guard to

enforce all applicable Federal laws on, under, and over the high seas and waters subject to the jurisdiction of the United States. Though the Coast Guard is the primary maritime agency, it has some things in common with other law enforcement and response-based organizations such as fire departments and emergency services. Almost all assistance and law enforcement organizations are uniformed services. Those that are not are still structured in similar ways, valuing discipline, strict protocols, and cultures akin to the military. Though there are differences, the Coast Guard can effectively bridge the gap between the rest of the military and federal, state, and local agencies.

This ability is important, for one thing is certain, and that is the Coast Guard cannot meet the needs of the nation alone. The small service needs to work in harmony with all the other services and agencies that are linked to providing security for the nation. There is a compelling need to develop deeper, joint relationships. The term joint connotes activities, operations, and organizations in which elements of two or more military departments participate.¹⁰ It means cooperation between services within the same department, as between the Army and Navy, for example. For the Coast Guard however, the term joint has a slightly different implication. To begin with, since it is not in the Department of Defense, the Coast Guard is not governed by the Defense Reorganization Act of 1986 (also known as the Goldwater-Nichols Act). The Coast Guard still adheres to the general spirit of the law though, for the small service must be able to engage in operations seamlessly with the other, larger services. The term therefore reflects association between the Coast Guard and the other military services (even though not located within the Department of Defense, the Coast Guard is still considered a military service because of the provisions of 14 U.S. Code) but it can also mean involvement with

the other organizations now located within the Department of Homeland Security. What was formerly considered interagency support can essentially be considered joint.

No matter the title or term used, the Coast Guard must continue to work closely with other organizations to produce synergistic results to properly protect America. While the new Department of Homeland Security aligns itself closely with the Departments of State, Justice, Commerce, and Transportation, the Coast Guard is to cultivating three major relationships to insure the nation's maritime security. Fundamentally, the Coast Guard allied itself with the other services within the Department of Defense. The service also, of necessity, entrenched itself with other federal, state, and local law enforcement agencies. Additionally, the Coast Guard, along with the other agencies of the Department of Homeland Security, is collaborating with industry.

The Coast Guard's relationship with the Navy is a very important one with longstanding historical ties. Notwithstanding this, the Coast Guard is building rapport with other military organizations. Though the "Posse Comitatus Act", Title 18 of the U.S. Code, essentially prohibits direct military involvement in law enforcement and limits the military's role in domestic affairs, provisions of Title 10 and Title 18 allow the military to support and assist in certain emergency situations. Specifically, crimes or situations involving nuclear materials (Title 18 USC Section 831) or chemical or biological weapons of mass destruction (Title 10 USC Section 382) warrant military intervention if U.S. interests are threatened. With the frequency and duration of armed forces deployments, close coordination is needed to ensure there are always properly trained and suitable units available and on call. This is where Northern Command (NORTHCOM) comes in. Though NORTHCOM does not have a large permanently assigned standing

force, it serves as a clearinghouse for units on a case-by-case basis. NORTHCOM provides unity of command for Department of Defense forces assigned homeland defense or civil support missions. It also has a permanently assigned staff that prepares plans to assist with consequence management. This staff serves as the point of contact for federal agencies that may need military assistance.

Another military relationship that has been developed is one with the National Guard and their Civil Support Teams. There were several compelling reasons for this. One is that these units are not typically bound by the same Title 10 restrictions as active duty units. Another consideration involves the personnel themselves. Unlike the active duty military, they do not necessarily rotate or transfer to different units as often. This allows them to cultivate deeper relations with local authorities and to develop greater familiarity with their region. Because of their state affiliations, greater opportunities for exercises and training exist. Furthermore, the National Guard has specific equipment readily available that greatly augments the Coast Guard's abilities. Their Weapons of Mass Destruction Teams for example, have provided valuable assistance by screening certain cargo suspected to have radiological or nuclear signatures. Conducting the tests offshore during an at sea boarding, helps prevent a potentially dangerous vessel from entering port.

Likewise, the Coast Guard and other services are including each other in various drills and exercises. Planners are considering various scenarios while anticipating possible terrorist actions. One such example is the possibility that a large ship may be taken over by terrorists that plan on heading into a major port and using the vessel itself as a weapon of mass destruction. A Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG) carrier for example, is

in and of itself a very dangerous vessel. Even without the threat of terrorism, they need to be handled with caution in a system with preventative safeguards already in place. If terrorists were to take control of such a ship and steer it into port, it could be used to produce catastrophic results. Ideally, the nation will identify and intercept threats long before they reach U.S. shores. Relations with intelligence agencies and the Navy should allow interdiction to occur far out at sea. There is a chance though, that enough intelligence may not develop and that the terrorists possibly wait to reveal their intentions until the vessel is already close to shore. With time running out, Navy and Coast Guard assets may not be the answer for a variety of reasons. They may be poorly positioned or otherwise unavailable. An aircraft armed with anti-ship missiles may be the best solution. If prior planning, coordination, and communications with the Air National Guard, for example, have already been established, an appropriate and timely response from an F-15 or F-16 on strip alert could possibly prevent disaster.

The Coast Guard is also deepening the already cooperative working relationships established with other key agencies such as the Federal Bureau of Investigation, and the new directorates located within the Department of Homeland Security to include Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE), Customs and Border Protection (CBP), including Border Patrol, Citizenship and Immigration Services (CIS), Transportation Security Administration (TSA), Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), and the Secret Service, as well as their equivalents at the state and local level.

A major benefit of frequent interaction is the information sharing that occurs. The Coast Guard's value here is that it has the right to use both, civilian law enforcement and military intelligence. This arrangement serves the Coast Guard well, allowing it to

possess the knowledge of what ships are destined for America and what cargo or people are coming as well. Maritime Domain Awareness, the comprehensive information, intelligence, and knowledge of all relevant entities within the U.S. Maritime Domain--and their respective activities--that could affect America's security, safety, economy, or environment, is the Coast Guard's specialty.¹¹

Intelligence is definitely a force multiplier that could make a difference in the new war against terrorism as well as in the longstanding war on drugs or even other forms of crime. The value of intelligence, however, is cheapened rapidly if it is not accurate, timely, and integrated. The vast amount of intelligence available and the numerous civil and military agencies involved, make it difficult to get the needed information to the proper destination so it can be acted upon. To smooth the progress of intelligence gathering and dissemination, with real time information sharing, more integrated command centers, similar to Joint Inter Agency Task Force (JIATF) East and West, are being formed. These command centers improve interagency cooperation and strengthen relationships. They also facilitate coordination between agencies since representatives are always at hand. This becomes invaluable during the planning and actual handling of critical incidents or significant threats. Additionally, major decisions concerning funding, priorities, and personnel utilization can be considered collectively.

The Coast Guard has always had a relationship with maritime industry. Since its inception, the Coast Guard, or its predecessors, were intimately involved with various facets of the nation's sea-borne commerce. From its earliest days, the service has collected revenue and tariffs, enforced embargoes, regulated shipping, and ensured safety of life and property at sea. The Coast Guard is entwined in the very fabric of the nation's port

system. Its unique military and civil legal authority has made the small service quite effective at serving as the maritime industry's shepherd. One of the key enablers permitting this success, are the Coast Guard's Captains of the Port.

The Espionage Act of 1917 and its expansion during the Second World War, and The Magnuson Act of 1950, led to creation and implementation of the Captain of the Port (COTP) positions. Now, with the implementation of The Maritime Transportation Security Act of 2002, the COTP is in the spotlight once again. Port Security is the premier mission of the Coast Guard. Units are actively engaged with ongoing operations across their areas, developing extensive networks relationships with the private sector.

Though there are diverse interests and varying points of view from all the many stakeholders, industry as a whole has a vested interest to protect the ports, transportation functions, and vulnerable infrastructure as well. Close relationships foster information sharing that will help thwart enemy actions. This idea is not new however, for long before the 11 September 2001 attacks, the Coast Guard, working with unions, the Federal Bureau of Investigations, and the Office of Naval Intelligence (ONI), set out to determine which dock workers and longshoremen were possible threats and imposed a system of security cards as far back as 1950.

In addition to being preventative, frequent interaction promotes interoperability, which will be imperative when responding to the aftermath of an attack, a natural disaster, or an accident of some sort. It is not just the Coast Guard, but the industry as well that wishes to isolate threats, minimize damage, and repair and regain use of facilities as rapidly as possible to minimize loss of revenues. The Coast Guard cannot provide port, ship, crew, and cargo security alone. A substantial amount of assistance

comes from the industry itself. In addition to information sharing, and conducting background checks of potential employees, commerce is engaged in competition to produce various security products and devise safety measures that will protect America.

With the limitations that its size and budget place on it, it is clear that the Coast Guard cannot face the enormous threat to the nation's maritime alone. Recognizing this, the Coast Guard is aggressively seeking to cultivate joint relationships that will capitalize on the idea of synergy. With these other services and agencies, the Coast Guard will deter, detect, and interdict threats to the country.

¹U.S. Coast Guard, *Maritime Strategy for Homeland Security* (Washington DC: U.S. Coast Guard Headquarters, December 2002), 1.

²U.S. Coast Guard, *Fiscal Year 2004 Report* (Washington DC: U.S. Coast Guard Headquarters, December 2004), 4.

³Ibid.

⁴Stephen E. Flynn, "Homeland Security is a Coast Guard Mission" *United States Naval Institute Proceedings* 127, no. 10 (October 2001): 72-76.

⁵Chris Halsne, "Huge Gaps in Port Security Exposed" *KIRO 7 Eyewitness News* KIROTVC.com, April 30, 2004.

⁶James D. Hessman, "A Maritime Challenge of Staggering Dimensions" *Sea Power* 46, no. 5 (May 2003): 21.

⁷Stephen E. Flynn, "Homeland Security is a Coast Guard Mission" *United States Naval Institute Proceedings* 127, no. 10 (October 2001): 72-76.

⁸Al Goodman, "Spain: Terror Cell Neutralized," April 14, 2004 CNN News; available from CNN.com, accessed April 16, 2004.

⁹William R. Daly, "Counterdrug Ops: Offer a Chance to Excel," *United States Naval Institute Proceedings* 130, no. 3 (March 2004): 67-71.

¹⁰Joint Pub 3-0.

¹¹U.S. Coast Guard, *Maritime Strategy for Homeland Security* (Washington DC: U.S. Coast Guard Headquarters, December 2002), 32.

CHAPTER 5

CONCLUSIONS

When war comes the great fleet will move out across the ocean, in all its majesty and striking power, to do battle for the cause. To the Navy will go all honor and glory. But the Coast Guard will be there too, absorbed in it all, with its gallant little craft always ready to do the duties for which it is specially fitted.¹

In a historical context, the Coast Guard's relationship with the Navy has proven to be beneficial for both services, but more importantly, for the nation. The Coast Guard should continue its relationship with the Navy, not just because of history or for the sake of heritage, but because it makes sense. By taking care of what some may call "low end" missions, the Coast Guard frees the Navy to concentrate on its war fighting role and maintaining command of the sea. As Hickman Powell, an author who wrote about the Coast Guard in 1941, said, "Indeed, one great military value of the Coast Guard is that it relieves the Navy of a great deal of detail, inshore and patrol work, and thus enables the fighting force to concentrate its efforts on matters of combat."²

The Coast Guard in return receives numerous benefits from a close and amicable relationship with the Navy. In the past, the Navy helped the Coast Guard with personnel issues such as training, specialized schools, and even with recruiting. The Navy also has loaned or even given vessels, aircraft, and other equipment to the Coast Guard. Additionally, the Navy has assisted with supply issues, provided repair and service support, and allowed the Coast Guard to use naval shipyards. In recent times, the Coast Guard has benefited from the advanced sensors and long endurance capabilities of the larger service's destroyers and frigates when the Navy has hosted LEDETs and TACLETs conducting counter-narcotics patrols.

However, with history repeating itself, at least in patterns if not in details, the Coast Guard must never allow itself to delve too deeply into naval duties. The Coast Guard should complement the Navy, but never compete with it. Because of the very nature of their duties, the missions of both services will have common characteristics. This overlap is not something to be avoided, but rather embraced as an opportunity to seal an otherwise exploitable seam in the nation's overall security. Failure to work closely with one another will lead to further degradation in interoperability. The Coast Guard should always be poised to augment the Navy if called upon to do so--not because of tradition, but because it is the law. Title 14, U.S. Code, section 2, requires the Coast Guard to maintain a state of readiness to function as a specialized service in the Navy in time of war, including the fulfillment of Maritime Defense Zone responsibilities, while section 3 requires the Coast Guard to operate as a service in the Navy upon declaration of war or when the President directs.

Conversely, attention is needed to ensure that the overlap does not lead to needless redundancy otherwise the small service may once again find itself at risk of being dismantled or merged with other organizations. This risk is not just with the Navy, but may be with other law enforcement agencies as well. When the Department of Homeland Security was first being organized, the Coast Guard was almost combined with other agencies and placed in the Border and Transportation Security directorate, much like what happened to the Customs Service, Border Patrol, and Immigration and Naturalization Service. What saved the service was the Commandant's ability to clearly articulate the benefits of leaving the Coast Guard intact and transferring the service as a whole to the new department. Key to the argument was the Coast Guard's multi mission

character and its capacity to respond instantly to a variety of emergencies. Once again, as in the past, the Coast Guard was rescued by the value the nation places on all of the missions the service performs, not just its role with national defense. As a result, the Coast Guard has not been placed within one of the directorates but rather is a separate, major component within the Department of Homeland Security. In fact, of the twenty-two agencies transferred to the new department, only two were kept in their entirety, the Secret Service and the Coast Guard.

This does not mean the Coast Guard should no longer have an expeditionary role. On the contrary, employing the small service properly overseas allows for the virtual export of security while providing opportunity for a political victory rather than just a military one. This can be done most effectively by using the Coast Guard to conduct cooperative engagements. The Commander of U.S. Southern Command, General Charles E. Wilhelm, U.S. Marine Corps, stated that, “The United States Coast Guard brings tremendous capabilities and contributions across a wide spectrum of regional engagement activities.”³

These engagement missions promote global security by building on common interests. To begin with, there are various parallels between operations in U.S. harbors and those in foreign ports. What is most important though, is that when the Coast Guard operates afar, it gains an appreciation for the risk as well as a better understanding of the threats that may come from other countries. This is in keeping with current administration’s policy of waging war abroad rather than having to fight terrorism at home. Functioning shoulder to shoulder with foreigners allows the gathering of valuable

intelligence that permits better preparation at home. Being both a law enforcement agency and military service permits the sharing of the information across all lines.

The Coast Guard is also an enabler for the promotion of good will and democratic ideals. Recognized world wide as a humanitarian organization, the Coast Guard does not have the threatening presence that other Department of Defense services do. This can be of utmost importance when legitimacy is a concern. Coast Guard forces operating abroad can more likely keep a low profile while effectively promoting peacetime engagement aspects of U.S. strategy. The multi mission nature of the Coast Guard provides a practical forum for nations to work together on non-military issues. This is particularly applicable once the military aspect of a war or campaign is over. The Coast Guard can more effectively deal with civilians of the foreign nation, especially non world powers.

Compared to most navies, especially the United States Navy, the Coast Guard is the best maritime model with a structure much more in alignment with any sea force smaller nations could ever hope to build. Most nations no matter their size, wish to protect their maritime interests. This means preserving natural resources, looking after the environment, and preventing illegal activities. The Coast Guard is the best agency in the world that can help small and developing nations deal with worldwide problems in these areas. Illegal aliens, arms smugglers, and drug traffickers are transnational threats that need to be eliminated everywhere, not just in America. Training other countries to deal with these issues essentially makes them partners with the U.S. Addressing the problem overseas like this, is another way the Coast Guard can leverage its efforts to prevent the trouble from reaching the United States. In order to be able to do all this however, the Coast Guard needs sufficient assets.

Hamstrung by three decades of mission creep and insufficient funding, the small service's equipment and infrastructure is all but worn out and, for practical reasons, should be considered obsolete.⁴ Despite its importance to national security, the Coast Guard conducts its missions using vessels and aircraft that have primitive radar systems with somewhat adequate surface-search capabilities but virtually no air-search capacity. Crews of some aircraft have night vision devices, but infrared equipment is usually not available and when it is, it is of older technology that severely limits its use. The service possesses no underwater search capabilities and must rely on the Navy to assist in that region. This state of affairs is not uncommon for the Coast Guard though. A similar situation existed in the 1890s, as substantiated by this paragraph written by Stephen H. Evans.

The country's increasing maritime needs thus fostered an expansion of the cutters' protective, preventative, and law enforcement duties both in scope and number, and the services' position as the federal government's principal agency for maritime law enforcement and marine safety attained wide recognition and support. Meanwhile, however, no comparable expansion of the service itself was effected, and although every cutter evidently was driven hard there was always more work than the organization possibly could accomplish with the means at its disposal.⁵

The Coast Guard is finally seeing an increase to its budget though, and is attempting to re-capitalize and modernize its fleet of cutters, small boats, aircraft, and Command, Control, Communications and Computers, Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (C4ISR) equipment through a program known as the Integrated Deepwater System (IDS). If sufficiently funded and administered properly, the Deepwater program will ensure that Coast Guard assets are appropriate for all missions. The plan and agenda for the Deepwater program, however, was put in motion before the attack on the nation 11 September 2001. Since then, assets have seen more utilization

than ever expected and the demand for them continues to increase. This intensified activity is causing the already aged fleet to decay faster than replacement assets can become available with the given schedule. Recent studies by the RAND Corporation reveal that the Coast Guard will not be prepared to handle its traditional missions plus new responsibilities if it sticks to the original plan. One new plan that could provide the small service with what it needs has twice the acquisition costs and would cost a third more to operate and support.⁶ A new plan like this will make it hard for the Coast Guard's leaders to get Congressional approval, especially since the service's operating budget has already been increased by 50 percent from 2002 to 2005.⁷

The Coast Guard's Admirals will have to be careful to find a suitable plan, lest Congress and the Navy come up with one less beneficial for the Coast Guard. It would be easy for the Navy to use this opportunity to shed unwanted vessels in favor of funding of their own programs. One such blip on the radar screen is the Navy's Cyclone class coastal patrol vessel. The Coast Guard was given tactical control of some of the vessels in this class in July 2002. Though the Navy has borne the burden of keeping the boats operational thus far, the Coast Guard will begin to share expenses with the Navy during fiscal year 2005.⁸ If these vessels are given to the Coast Guard instead of the appropriate budget, the service will find itself in a position similar to the one the service faced in the past. Captain Shepard, Commandant of the U.S. Revenue-Marine Service, wrote the following in the service's 1891 annual report:

The policy pursued for many years past, of making extensive repairs to the old vessels, is a mistaken one. Had the same amount of money, with a little more added, been judiciously expended in the building of new vessels of a modern type, the Service would now have a much more efficient force. . . . New Vessels are urgently needed.⁹

The admirals definitely face an enormous challenge in garnering Congressional support for an increase in its budget that has already been enlarged greater than ever before. The return on the investment should more than justifying the additional funding, though. As Admiral James M. Loy, former Commandant of the Coast Guard and now Deputy Secretary of Homeland Security, has said about the small service, “No other arm of government provides tangible benefits in like proportion to its budget.”¹⁰

It has not only been members of the service who have voiced this thought either, for Secretary of State Madeleine Albright said, “The vast majority of us understand that the Coast Guard provides the best value of any institution in our government.”¹¹

One such example that reinforces these statements is the Coast Guard’s contribution to the nation’s efforts to counter illegal drug trafficking. In 1997, the Coast Guard interdicted more than 103,600 pounds of cocaine having a street value estimated at \$3.65 billion--a half a billion dollars greater than that year’s entire operating budget.¹² The seizure of all this cocaine meant less drugs on the streets and in the schools--something that is very important, but not readily quantifiable. This concept also applies to the Coast Guard’s Search and Rescue efforts, wherein the service renders assistance to vessels in distress and saves life and property on a daily basis. While the vessels and cargoes saved have financial value that can be computed and shown to offset the appropriation for the Coast Guard, the worth of human life is hard to ascertain. Without a doubt, some people feel that the performance of this duty alone more than balances the Coast Guard’s budget.

Citing moral and sentimental value, and feelings of security, along with financial assessments, may help the Admirals win the argument, but only if enough of the voting

constituents feel the same. Despite the fact that most Americans live within one hundred miles of navigable waters, many do not understand what exactly the Coast Guard does for the nation. The service goes about its business whether the nation is at war or not. Even though many important tasks are accomplished every day, unless the media chooses to cover an event, the Coast Guard has relatively little exposure to the public. This idea ties in with the title of this thesis.

The tragic events of 11 September 2001, have led many to believe that all the rules have changed. It has since been a time of transformation for many of the country's organizations as they seek to find their place. The Coast Guard's role really has not changed that much though, for it has always greatly contributed to the security of the nation--the Homeland Security mission is just getting much more public attention now. With the nation at war, some may wonder why the Coast Guard has not been placed under the control of the Navy. For one, this is only done so at the direction of the President--it is not automatic. For another, it does not make sense to do so in consideration of the type of threat that faces the nation. With the current National Security Strategy, the Coast Guard can contribute more by staying intact, producing synergistic results by conducting all of its traditional missions. In his State of the Coast Guard address of March 2003, Commandant of the Coast Guard Admiral Thomas H. Collins said, "We have much to contribute to both the safety and security of our great nation. It's our calling, it's our responsibility." In that same address he said, "This is our time."¹³

For all practical purposes then, it can be said that the Coast Guard's flag has already come forward and that it is where it belongs--flying proudly alongside the

Department of Defense forces, and with those of the agencies now a part of the new Department of Homeland Security. Both should be considered positions of honor. Its rank or position relative to the flags of the other services and agencies really does not matter. What does, is that the Coast Guard's flag is flying along side them. Also, consider that the Coast Guard is the only service with a flag flying in two places. The importance of this is that it symbolizes the service's diverse and unique contributions to the nation. Though national defense is extremely important, it is only a portion of what the Coast Guard does. Other duties, which continue to grow, are vital to America as well. The leaders of the Coast Guard must never forget the importance of all of the missions, whether they are currently receiving public notice or not. The Coast Guard needs to continue to strive for a balance between being a naval force, a law enforcement agency, a regulatory bureau, and a humanitarian organization. Essentially, this means the Coast Guard must focus on being what it truly is--the world's best coast guard.

¹Hickman Powell, *What The Citizen Should Know About The Coast Guard* (New York: W.W. Norton and Company, 1941), 189.

²Ibid., 176.

³Charles E. Wilhelm, General, United States Marine Corps, Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Southern Command, Letter to Mortimer L. Downey, Deputy Secretary of Transportation, U.S. Department of Defense, 26 May 1999.

⁴James D Hessman, "Three Decades of Mission Creep" *Sea Power* 41, no. 9 (September 1998): 47-48.

⁵Stephen H. Evans, *The United States Coast Guard 1790-1915: A Definitive History* (Annapolis: U.S. Naval Institute, 1949), 150.

⁶Rust, Emily, "Study: Coast Guard Plan Inadequate," 26 April, 2004, *CNN Washington Bureau*; available from CNN.com, accessed 28 April, 2004.

⁷Caroline Drees, “Coast Guard Chief Sees Post-September 11 Shortfalls,” *Planet Ark*, [article on-line]; available from <http://www.planetark.com>; internet; accessed on 6 May 2004.

⁸Geoffrey A.C.Mones, “The Coast Guard Needs Help From...Navy and Marine Corps,” *United States Naval Institute Proceedings* 130, no. 1 (January 2004): 40-45.

⁹Evans, 153.

¹⁰James D Hessman, “Three Decades of Mission Creep,” *Sea Power* 41, no. 9 (September 1998): 47-48.

¹¹T.D. Kilvert-Jones, “An Active and Acceptable Presence,” *Sea Power* 42, no. 12 (December 1999): 47-49.

¹²James Loy, “The Coast Guard is Maritime Security,” *United States Naval Institute Proceedings* 124, no. 12 (December 1998): 26-29.

¹³Paul Davis, “Semper Paratus: The Coast Guard is ‘Always Ready’ to Protect America’s Ports & Waters” *Journal of Counterterrorism & Homeland Security International* 10, No. 1 (2004): 32-37.

GLOSSARY

Department of Homeland Security (DHS): The Homeland Security Act of 2002 established the Department of Homeland Security whose primary mission is to prevent, protect against, and respond to acts of terrorism on our soil.

Homeland Defense (HLD): Homeland Defense is the protection of U.S. territory, domestic population and critical infrastructure against military attacks emanating from outside the United States.

Homeland Security (HLS): Homeland Security is a concerted national effort to prevent terrorist attacks within the United States, reduce America's vulnerability to terrorism, and minimize the damage and recover from attacks that do occur.

Law Enforcement Detachment (LEDET): A Law Enforcement Detachment is a highly deployable, small team of U.S. Coast Guard personnel who principally conduct maritime law enforcement tasking from Coast Guard units, U.S. Navy ships, and selected foreign navy ships.

Maritime Domain Awareness (MDA): Maritime Domain Awareness is comprehensive information, intelligence, and knowledge of all relevant entities within the U.S. Maritime Domain – and their respective activities –that could affect America's security, safety, economy, or environment.

Maritime Safety and Security Teams (MSST): Maritime Safety and Security Teams are U.S. Coast Guard mobile units established for maritime homeland security missions in response to the terrorist attacks of 11 September, 2001. These 100-person units are modeled after the Coast Guard's existing Port Security Units and LEDETs to provide a fast deployment capability for homeland security. Like all Coast Guard units, MSSTs are multi-mission capable, and can conduct SAR and LE enforcement missions, as well as maritime security tasking. MSSTs will deploy in support of National Security Special Events such as OpSail, Super-Bowls, and Olympics, as well as for severe weather recovery operations, protection of military load-outs, enforcement of security zones, defense of critical waterside facilities in strategic ports, and interdiction of illegal activities.

National Strike Force (NSF): The National Strike Force is a U.S. Coast Guard capability composed of three mobile units established for rapid response to oil discharge and hazardous substance releases. With highly specialized equipment, NSF units support Federal On-Scene Coordinators and Coast Guard incident commanders to reduce the environmental damage from oil discharge and hazardous substance releases. Since the NSF also has a CBRNE capability (That was used in the aftermath of the bio-terrorism attacks on the U.S. Capital), the NSF has a major role in homeland security preparedness and recovery operations in the U.S. Maritime Domain.

Sea Marshals: Sea Marshals are a U.S. Coast Guard capability to intercept and board incoming ships to the United States prior to the ship's arrival in U.S. ports, principally to deter and prevent the ship itself from being used as a means to conduct a terrorist attack in the port. Upon boarding a vessel Sea Marshals meet with the ship's captain to explain their purpose and check cargo manifests and crew lists. They stand guard in critical areas of the ship, including the bridge, keeping a watchful eye for suspicious behavior. Ships carrying hazardous materials or those hailing from other countries that the United States has identified as having terrorist links or unfriendly relations with the United States area five the highest priority. Other vessels are boarded randomly, both in port and at sea.

Tactical Law Enforcement Team (TACLET): LEDETs are consolidated into three TACLETs located in Yorktown, VA., Miami, FL., and San Diego, CA., and deploy worldwide.

Terrorism: Terrorism is characterized as any premeditated, unlawful act dangerous to human life or public welfare that is intended to intimidate or coerce civilian populations or governments.

U.S. Maritime Domain: The U.S. Maritime Domain encompasses all U.S. ports, inland waterways, harbors, navigable waters, Great Lakes, territorial seas, contiguous waters, custom waters, coastal seas, littoral areas, the U.S. Exclusive Economic Zone, and oceanic regions of U.S. national interests, as well as the sea-lanes to the United States, U.S. maritime approaches, and the high seas surrounding America.

APPENDIX A

HIGH-ENDURANCE CUTTERS



The 12 ships in the Hamilton class were commissioned in the late 1960s and early 1970s, and several saw extensive combat duty in Vietnam. The class underwent a fleet rehabilitation and modernization (FRAM) from 1985 through 1992, receiving upgrades to radars and other sensors, fire-control systems, weapons, and helicopter flight-deck facilities. Their high-endurance capabilities enable them to conduct long-range operations and to serve as command platforms in support of a variety of missions--particularly maritime security, which includes drug interdiction, illegal immigrant interception, and fisheries enforcement. On occasion, these ships have deployed as units of Navy carrier battle groups. Two Hamilton-class cutters--*Boutwell* and *Dallas*--deployed in support of Operation Iraqi Freedom in 2003.

Hamilton Class	
DISPLACEMENT:	3,300 tons full load
LENGTH:	378 feet
BEAM:	42 feet
SPEED:	29 knots
POWER PLANT:	two diesel engines, 7,000 bhp, two gas turbines, two controllable-pitch propeller
RANGE:	9,600 nautical miles at 15 knots
ARMAMENT:	one Mk75 76mm gun, two Mk38 25mm guns, one Phalanx CIWS, two .50-caliber machine guns, two SRBOC launchers
AIRCRAFT:	one HH-65 or MH-68 helicopter
COMPLEMENT:	167
BUILDER:	Avondale Shipyards, New Orleans, LA

Source: 2004 Almanac of Sea Power, *Sea Power* 47, no. 1 (January 2004): 119.

APPENDIX B

MEDIUM-ENDURANCE CUTTERS



The 13 Famous-class and 14 Reliance-class cutters form the two primary classes of medium-endurance cutters (WMECs). Two older unique WMECs, *Storis* and *Acushnet*, are based in Alaska. An additional WMEC was added in 1999 when a former Navy salvage ship was commissioned *Alex Haley*, also based in Alaska. Like the WHECs, these cutters support a variety of missions. The Famous-class cutters, which began entering service in 1983, are equipped with shipboard command-and-control system (SCCS-270) that permits maximum operational effectiveness with reduced crews. They are also fitted with a modern weapons and sensor suite and can support and hanger one HH-65, HH-60, or MH-68 helicopter. These ships also can land Navy SH-60B LAMPS III helicopter. The 14 Reliance-class cutters do not have hangers but each can support one HH-65 or MH-68 helicopter. All ships of the Reliance class have completed mid-life maintenance availability to upgrade machinery and equipment. *Alex Haley*--originally commissioned in 1971 as UUS *Edenton* (ATS 1)--was converted to a WMEC by Coast Guard Yard, Baltimore, MD. Excessive maintenance requirements forced the decommissioning of two Reliance-class cutters in 2001: *Courageous* (WMEC 622) and *Durable* (WMEC 628).

Famous Class	
DISPLACEMENT:	1,820 tons full load
LENGTH:	270 feet
BEAM:	38 feet
SPEED:	19.5 knots
POWER PLANT:	two diesel engines, two shafts, 7,300 bhp
RANGE:	12,700 nautical miles at 15 knots
ARMAMENT:	one Mk75 76mm, two .50-caliber machine guns, two SRBOC launchers
AIRCRAFT:	one HH-65, MH-68 , or HH-60 helicopter
COMPLEMENT:	100
BUILDER:	WMECs 901-904, Tacoma Boatbuilding Co., Tacoma, WA; 905-913, R.E. Derecktor of Rhode Island Inc., Middletown RI

Reliance Class	
DISPLACEMENT:	1,020 tons full load
LENGTH:	210.5 feet
BEAM:	34 feet
SPEED:	18 knots
POWER PLANT:	two diesel engines, two shafts, 5,000 bhp
RANGE:	6,100 nautical miles at 14 knots
ARMAMENT:	one Mk75 76mm, two .50-caliber machine guns
AIRCRAFT:	one HH-65 or MH-68 helicopter
COMPLEMENT:	75
BUILDER:	WMECs 615-17, Todd Shipyards, Houston, TX; 618, Christy Corp., Sturgeon Bay, WI; 620-624, 626, 627, 630, American Shipbuilding, Lorain, OH;

Alex Haley Class	
DISPLACEMENT:	3,000 tons full load
LENGTH:	282 feet
BEAM:	50 feet
SPEED:	18 knots
POWER PLANT:	four Caterpillar diesels, two shafts/CPP, bow thruster
RANGE:	10,000 nautical miles at 13 knots
ARMAMENT:	two Mk38 25mm machine guns, two .50-caliber machine guns
AIRCRAFT:	one HH-65 MH068or MH-68 helicopter
COMPLEMENT:	99
BUILDER:	Coast Guard Yard, Baltimore, MD

Source: 2004 Almanac of Sea Power, *Sea Power* 47, no. 1 (January 2004): 119, 120.

APPENDIX C

HH-65 DOLPHIN



The HH-65 helicopter is the Coast Guard's most ubiquitous aircraft, flying approximately 50,000 flight hours annually. It is certified for operation in all-weather nighttime operations, with the exception of icing conditions. The aircraft uses a four-axis automatic pilot that can be coupled to the flight controls for hands-free operation during execution of search patterns, instrument flight plans, and approaches to hover. The Mission Computer Unit (MCU)--the heart of the aircraft's fully integrated avionics package (built with the 1970s technology)--is being replaced. The engine-control system also will be replaced--with extremely reliable state-of-the-art, digital-control technology. Weight growth from additional rescue swimmers and various systems--which has added approximately 850 pounds in mission weights with no corresponding increase in engine power available--has been a problem with the HH-65. The additional weight has been offset by using smaller fuel loads, which results in reduced mission endurance. The Coast Guard's National Distress System Modernization Program (NDSMP) will increase weight and space requirements and adversely affect all Coast Guard aircraft, especially the HH-65. Forward-looking infrared radar (FLIR) will be installed aboard three HH-65s for law-enforcement operations in the Caribbean area of responsibility; this will be the first permanent installation of FLIR technology on the HH-65 and will utilize third-generation technology with a 5-10 year obsolescence window. HH-65 crews have completed night-vision-goggle (NVG) implementation, greatly enhancing nighttime search capabilities. The HH-65 is typically the only Coast Guard aircraft used aboard cutters during deployments. There are currently 96 HH-65s in service; 48 have been modified to the HH-65B versions, equipped with CDU-900G control display units and MFD-255 multifunction displays.

HH-65 Dolphin	
FUSELAGE LENGTH:	44.5 feet
HEIGHT:	13 feet
WEIGHT:	maximum allowable gross, 9,200 pounds
SPEED:	maximum, 165 knots; cruise, 130 knots
RANGE:	cruise, 400 nautical miles; radius of action, 150 nautical miles
CREW:	two pilots, flight mechanic, rescue swimmer
POWER PLANT:	two Lycoming LTS-101-750B-2 gas turbine engines
CONTRACTOR:	Eurocopter

Source: 2004 Almanac of Sea Power, *Sea Power* 47, no. 1 (January 2004): 128.

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